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Large systems engineering projects have an astonishingly high failure rate. The reasons 
hypothesized for such a high failure rate include the neglect of nonsalient system elements 
such as social and human or organizational aspects of systems. Social and human factors have 
long been known to be critical elements of systems that are frequently ignored (e.g., Goguen, 
1994). Systems engineering processes can benefit and be improved by effective utilization of a 
framework that helps developers expand their attention and efforts beyond the salient aspects 
of the system and the development process. In the aviation field, the Human Factors Analysis 
and Classification System (HFACS) is used to facilitate the consideration of non-salient, easily 
overlooked influences on the potential for aviation mishaps. This system has improved the 
effectiveness of the aviation accident investigation by helping investigators perform a thorough 
analysis of the system factors that may have contributed to the accident. HFACS helps aviation 
organizations improve their quality assessment and monitoring by making explicit the 
relationships between a wide range of organizational factors and accident risks. In this 
research, a framework similar to HFACS was developed for the systems engineering domain. 
ix 
The purpose of the framework is to guide and improve systems engineering projects. This 
research was conducted using qualitative methods to identify the elements and structure of a 
framework for quality improvement in system engineering. Data extracted from interviews and 
systems engineering literature was assessed in a bottom-up manner to identify emergent 
patterns and in a top-down manner using HFACS-based themes. The framework developed 
from this research can be used to guide systems development organizations analyze both the 
obvious and the latent reasons behind a project’s failure. This would help systems development 
teams to better understand the causal factors underlying a systems development failure and 
look out for them in the future. Using the framework, organizations and development teams 
can better understand the positive effects of considering all elements of a system, including the 
social and human factors that may not be obvious.
1 
Introduction 
        Late in his career, accomplished computer scientist and mathematician Joseph Goguen 
sought to bring attention to the importance of addressing the relationship between social and 
technical factors in systems engineering. Goguen (1994) noted that “large projects have an 
embarrassingly high failure rate” (p. 165), and suggested the neglect of social factors has 
something to do with it. The Standish Group’s “CHAOS Report” provides information on 
software project failures and the factors that lead to failure. The project failure rates reported 
during 1994-2009 can be seen in Table 1. 
Table 1 
 The Standish Group’s “CHAOS Report” Showing Information Technology (IT) Project Failures and 
Successes from 1994-2009. 
Year Failed Projects Challenged Projects Successful Projects 
1994 31% 53% 16% 
1996 40% 33% 27% 
1998 28% 46% 26% 
2000 23% 49% 28% 
2004 18% 53% 29% 
2006 19% 46% 35% 
2009 24% 44% 32% 
Note. Adapted from “The rise and fall of the chaos report figures” by J.L. Eveleens and C. Verhoef, 2010. IEEE 
Software. Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 6, 30-36, p. 31. 
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 In the above table, successful projects are projects completed on time and within 
budget showing all the features that were intended; challenged projects are projects that were 
completed with an overshooting of both budget and time estimates and also showing fewer 
features than intended; and failed projects are projects that were cancelled before completion. 
        The statistics are especially alarming in light of the costs of large systems and software 
engineering projects. For example, the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) spent $4 billion on a 
system that, as described by an IRS official, does “not work in the real world,” (Marketplace, 
1997).  
Other examples of systems development failure include: 
 Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) Virtual Case File (VCF) project which was 
supposed to automate the FBI’s paper-based work environment, allow agents and 
intelligence analysts to share vital investigative information, and replace the obsolete 
Automated Case Support (ACS) system. The bureau had to scrap the US $580 million 
project. Factors that may have contributed to the VCF's failure include:  poorly defined 
and slowly evolving design requirements; overly ambitious schedules; and the lack of a 
plan to guide hardware purchases, network deployments, and software development 
for the bureau (Goldstein, 2005).  
 A computer-aided dispatching system was developed for the London Ambulance Service 
(LAS) to replace the manual system. The LAS received calls; dispatched ambulances 
based on an understanding of the nature of the calls and the availability of resources; 
and monitored progress of the response to the call. This new system was designed to 
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include an automatic vehicle locating system (AVLS) and mobile data terminals (MDTs) 
to support automatic communication with ambulances. Immediately after becoming 
operational, the call traffic increased heavily and the system could not keep track of the 
location and status of units and incorrect databases were formed. Instances of the 
ambulance crew arriving at their location to find the patient dead and the ambulance 
answering a “stroke call” as much as 11 hours after the call illustrated the ineffective 
functioning of the system. Eight days after the deployment, the system was seized 
completely (Finkelstein & Dowell, 1996). 
 NIMROD was a large, UK government –funded, early warning defense system project. 
Huge amounts of money were poured in and many hundreds of people were hired 
(Bush, 1997). What looked like a magnificent project in the making, was not really so. 
This project involved the development of both novel hardware and software. There 
were problems with both areas, and also with the compatibility of the two. After ten 
years of work and 100 million pounds spent, the funding was cut and a version of the 
U.S. Airborne Weapons and Control System (AWACS) was adopted. Reasons behind the 
project’s failure could be the often increasing requirements, ineffective change 
management, unrealistic schedules and inefficient communication among development 
staff (Bush, 1997).  
  The Theater Battle Management Core System (TBMCS) is an air command and control 
(C2) system that performed standardized, secure automated air battle planning and 
execution management for Air Force, multi-service, and allied commanders in the 
theaters of operation worldwide. According to Collens and Krause (2005), some of the 
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problems faced which may have contributed to the failure of the initial system 
development effort (a follow-on effort was considered successful) included: 
 The initial high level system architecture design affected the design and 
development of the system. 
  The requirements management and allocation process for producing the first 
release of TBMCS was inefficient. 
 The system and subsystem design was severely hampered by the complexity of 
interfacing with legacy applications. Application vendors were not funded and 
did not give away the code. 
  Miscalculation of the maturity and complexity of commercial and third party 
software products.  
 Lack of understanding of how the system would be used and employed by the 
different groups of users.  
  Difficulty in the integration of such a complex system.  
 Testing on TBMCS was conducted in contexts that lacked real-world complexity 
and demands. 
 Another complex system development effort that did not fare well was the 
mechanization of mines in England in the 1950s (Trist & Bamforth, 1951). Innovation 
and automation were given top priorities and social aspects were neglected. The 
introduction of this new method was followed by unchanged productivity and severely 
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deteriorated relations among miners and within the mining community. Factors that 
could have attributed to the failure of the system included the neglect of social and 
psychological phenomena (Trist & Bamforth, 1951). 
        In each of the above systems development examples, a variety of factors were at play, 
interacting in complex ways. Note that in each case, the developers neglected or experienced 
difficulty with factors relating to users (user requirements, interface with technology, demands, 
work practices and work culture). To shed more light on the types of factors that can influence 
the outcome of systems development efforts, the last of the systems development examples 
will be described in great detail. 
The Longwall Mining Case Study 
        An example of the neglect of relationships between key system elements in systems 
engineering can be seen in the sociotechnical analysis and case study of the mechanization of 
mining in England (Trist & Bamforth, 1951).  In this example, the effects of new technologies on 
workers’ interdependencies and relationships were not considered prior to the introduction of 
the technologies. 
        The traditional mining method in England had, until mechanization in the mid-1900s, 
been the “hand got” method. According to Trist and Bamforth, “Most competent authorities 
appear to be agreed that the ‘hand-got’ methods that preceded the longwall provided the face-
worker with a social balance that has since been lost” (p. 4). Hand-got work groups had 
“responsible autonomy”; they worked in self-paced, self-selected interdependent working pairs 
to which one or two other people might be attached. Even though the miners had simple 
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equipment, they had multiple tasks to perform which required multiplicity of skills. They took 
pride in doing their duties and relied on themselves alone for achieving work goals. Workmates 
developed close relationships and strong loyalties that extended to one another’s families.  
        The social organization of hand-got teams reflected decades, if not centuries, of 
adaptation to work demands. The organization was especially well adapted to the stressful and 
high-risk conditions of the underground mining environment. Teammates looked after one 
another and could adapt their work pace and strategies flexibly to challenging conditions that 
emerged (e.g., conditions such as loss of control over the roof, reduced working heights at the 
typically 3-ft high coal face, and faults affecting the continuity of the coal seam). 
        With the introduction of coal-cutters and mechanical conveyers, mining operations in 
England were changed so that the mining work was done by large teams working across a 
broad face and multiple coal seams. Thus, mechanization replaced the small self-reliant teams 
with large groups, usually composed of forty to fifty men, performing large scale activities side-
by-side by without any interdependency. They worked in “functional isolation” (p. 30) from the 
other men on the same shift. The coal-getting task was performed in three sequential shifts:  
the cutting, ripping and filling-off shifts. The ease and productivity of work during the two later 
shifts depended on the work of the shifts preceding them. As an example, the cutting shift was 
required to cut the coal to specific dimensions. If the cutters failed to meet those dimensions, 
the jobs of workers in the next stage became more difficult. The filling-off shift, where the coal 
was moved on to the conveyer and where the largest number of men was employed, was 
where troubles encountered across all shifts would accumulate. Although the work of the 
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earlier shifts was closely related to the work of later shifts, Trist and Bamforth note that the 
tasks were done in strict isolation and the workers never even met. 
        The sequential nature of the shifts did not accommodate common challenges of mining; 
rather, it assumed that each job could be performed with equal proficiency by each miner, 
regardless of age or health, and on each day, regardless of mine conditions. Neither time nor 
adequate pay was allotted for handling challenges. Arrangements were not made to assist 
those with lower stamina. This increased stress on workers and increased tension among 
workers and between shifts. Tension between shifts developed because later shifts were not 
privy to the challenges that resulted in reduced work output or quality by a preceding shift and 
which increased work demands for them. Inter-team conflicts were common with the handgot 
mining team, but they improved intra-team solidarity. In contrast, both inter- and intra-shift 
conflicts began to arise within the longwall mining team and miners found themselves on their 
own in a system that reinforced individualism.  
        Mechanization did not require a miner use his varied skill set; nor did it respect the 
‘underground expertise’ of the older miner. Every group did the same specific task every day; 
this task and the worker’s productivity became the basis for worker status within the new 
system. The payment method, for example, pay per hole, pay per yard, and day wage, also had 
an effect on the worker’s job satisfaction. Apart from the specific task a miner was assigned, 
special tasks called “bye-work” would be required at times. Bye work was work that had to be 
done to make possible the smooth execution of mining tasks across shifts—e.g., fixing a roof. 
Miners did not feel they were compensated fairly for bye work, nor for their usual work when 
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faced with challenging conditions—which was not uncommon. This had a tremendous effect on 
the worker’s attitude towards work. Moreover workers in unfavorable natural conditions (e.g., 
low ceilings or poorly prepared faces) tended to be less likely to put forth good effort, out of 
annoyance over the conditions and because the low-quality work could be blamed on the bad 
conditions. 
        Trist and Bamforth assert that the social changes brought about by mechanization were 
largely to blame for subsequent low productivity, low morale, and a high turnover rate. Even 
“widespread incidence of psycho-somatic and kindred neurotic disorders” (p. 30) among miners 
was seen, which highlights the “human” costs of neglecting psychological and sociological 
factors under mechanization. 
Goguen on How to Address the Social Aspects of Systems 
       Thus far some examples of system development failures have been discussed. This and 
the following sections will describe more about the goals of systems engineering, in particular 
the systems thinking concept. 
        Goguen implicates as a root cause of the very high system development failure rate the 
neglect of key system elements during engineering projects. In particular, Goguen points to the 
social elements of the system—the technology users and the users’ organization—as routinely 
neglected and poorly addressed by systems developers. Additional evidence of this tendency to 
neglect human and social aspects can be found in the effort to add a human view to the 
Department of Defense Architectural Framework (DoDAF; Baker, Stewart, Pogue, & Ramotar, 
2008; Bruseberg, 2008; Handley & Smillie, 2008). Goguen used ethnomethodology as a tool to 
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study the importance of social aspects of a system. Ethnomethodology is a method for 
understanding the ways in which culture shapes and imbues the work practices, goals, and 
priorities of people in an organization by analyzing their accounts of their day-to-day 
experiences, their work artifacts and their communications. It is a descriptive method and does 
not engage in the explanation or evaluation of the particular culture undertaken as a topic of 
study.  Goguen (1997) stated, “Ethnomethodology tries to reconcile radical empiricism with the 
situatedness of social data, by looking closely at how competent members of a group actually 
organize their interactions” (p. 10). 
        Goguen used ethnomethodology to explain the principle of accountability and the 
principle of orderliness. According to the principle of accountability, the members in a group are 
held accountable for their actions depending upon where their group is placed in the society or, 
in our context, in the organization. Thus, the behavior and interaction of members of a work 
group are constrained by the nature of accountability imposed by the group. According to the 
principle of orderliness, social interaction and behavior are orderly and can be understood with 
respect to contextual and cultural constraints. Thus, a group’s interaction can only be fully 
understood in the context of that particular group, which is the essence of ‘qualities of 
situatedness’. Thus to understand a system, the work group should be analyzed. The failure to 
take into account this human side of the system leads to system designs that are poorly 
matched to an organization’s work culture and practices. Trist and Bamforth make this point. 
All analysis of the mining system problems were analytical (dry); neglecting the social aspects of 
the system.  Thus, ethnomethodological approaches play a vital role in the development and 
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achievement of systems thinking, an important systems engineering perspective that will be 
explained in the next section.  
Systems Engineering Quality Improvement 
        According to the International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE, 2006), a system 
is “a construct or collection of different elements that together produce results not obtainable 
by the elements alone. The elements, or parts, can include people, hardware, software, 
facilities, policies, and documents; that is, all things required to produce systems-level results" 
(“Definition of a System”, para. 1).  
        Note that people are included in this definition as a core system element. Thus although 
people and related social factors tend to be neglected by systems developers, the systems 
engineering profession identifies them as key factors to be addressed. Furthermore, the 
systems engineering profession emphasizes the importance of systems thinking - the 
consideration of a system in a holistic way, in terms of all its components and their 
relationships. Again, the inclusion of people and social issues in the systems engineering 
problem space would seem to be a goal of the profession and, by extension, of any group 
endeavoring to develop or adapt a system. 
        To help developers engineer systems in ways consistent with the goal of systems 
thinking and the definition of a system, a framework is proposed. This framework will help 
developers monitor whether they are engineering the system in a balanced way, that is, 
whether they are addressing all systems elements and their relationships and whether they are 
using processes, methods, and tools that support a balanced and holistic approach. In doing so 
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the framework should help developers handle the social aspects of systems as well as they 
handle the technical aspects. Goguen’s concerns might be reduced and, likewise, the number of 
unsuccessful system development efforts and unusable or user-hostile systems might be 
reduced. 
        Systems thinking helps developers consider the mutual dependence of all system 
components. It promotes team effort by integrating all the disciplines and forms a well defined 
development process.  Systems thinking also helps systems developers understand both the 
emergent characteristics of the system and various development and acquisition risks, which 
thereby helps them achieve the final goal efficiently.  Thus systems thinking strives to provide a 
quality product in which all elements, including users, interact well with and support one 
another.  
Approaches for Achieving Quality in Systems Engineering 
        According to Goguen (1997), “The very rapid rate of change of requirements, which is so 
typical of large projects, implies an even more rapid rate of change for specifications. This 
makes many formal methods very difficult, perhaps even impossible, to apply in practice” (p. 
115).  
        Goguen (1997) stresses the point that systems engineering must be highly flexible, 
supportive of emergent requirements and open, in the sense that it has to adapt to the changes 
in the customer needs.  
         An evolutionary systems engineering approach, an approach that addresses both the 
social and the technical aspects of systems, is thought by Goguen to be the key to systems that 
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integrate users with technology, and which are more likely to produce systems development 
successes. An evolutionary approach, in which a system is gradually developed in its context of 
use, is more consistent with the realities of requirements and system life cycles than currently 
popular approaches. 
         The requirements for a large system are tough to determine; the requirements only 
become clear when the system is successfully operating in its social and organizational context; 
requirements evolve as system development proceeds, and a reasonably complete and 
consistent set of requirements for a large, complex system emerge as it is used. Determining 
whether some system meets its true requirements is the outcome of a complex social process 
that typically involves negotiation, and may involve legal action. Thus it is usually entirely 
misleading to think of requirements as pre-given. 
        According to Goguen (1997), “lifecycle phases cannot be fully formalized. Indeed, the 
activities that are necessary for a successful system development project cannot always be 
expected to fit in a natural way into any system of pre-given categories.” (p. 7) and “the 
requirements phase of a large system development project is the most error-prone, and these 
errors are the most expensive to correct” (Boehm, 1986 Davis, 1990 as cited by Goguen). 
        Goguen’s claim about the neglect of social factors in system development efforts, is 
echoed in the work of Robert Hoffman, a human factors methodologist who notes that popular 
software and system engineering approaches (e.g., waterfall, spiral, and agile development 
frameworks) are noticeably lacking in guidance for integrating technology designs with their 
users and use environments (e.g., Hoffman & Elm, 2006). Two of the most popular and 
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influential systems engineering tools, the waterfall development model and the spiral 
development model are discussed below, followed by a discussion of a popular approach to 
systems development quality assurance called the Capability Maturity Model Integration 
(CMMI). Each is presented as an example of a popular and accepted approach to quality 
assurance in systems engineering that neglects human and social factors of systems. 
The waterfall model. In the waterfall model, the process proceeds from one phase to 
the next in a purely sequential manner. For example, when the requirements specification is 
fully completed, one proceeds to design. This design should be a plan for implementing the 
requirements given. When the design is fully completed, an implementation of that design is 
made by coders. Towards the later stages of this implementation phase, separate software 
components produced are combined to introduce new functionality and reduced risk through 
the removal of errors. The waterfall model can be seen in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. The waterfall model. Adapted from “Managing the Development of Large Software 
Systems” by Royce (1970). Proceedings of IEEE WESCON 26, 1–9, p. 329   
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        The waterfall model is defective in large and complex systems development projects 
where the requirements constantly keep changing and where stepwise completion of the 
processes is not a reality because later stages affect the work of earlier stages. While using the 
waterfall model, if clients change their requirements after the design work ends, the design will 
not be modified to accommodate the new requirements.  
The Spiral development model. The spiral development model, as seen in Figure 2, is a 
software development process introduced by Boehm (1986) combining the benefits of 
prototyping (an iterative process of building a model of a system) and the waterfall model in an 
effort to combine advantages of top-down and bottom-up development approaches (A top-
down approach is essentially the breaking down of a system to gain insight into its 
compositional sub-systems. Here an overview of the system is first formulated and then each 
subsystem refined in greater detail until the entire specification is reduced to base elements.  A 
bottom-up approach to development is done in a data-driven, context-specific manner and not 
based on generic pre-determined structure).  
        The spiral model is intended for large, expensive and complicated projects. In every 
iteration, project risks are effectively identified and handled. A preliminary design is created for 
the new system. A first prototype of the new system is constructed from the preliminary 
design. This prototype is evaluated in terms of its strengths, weaknesses, and development 
risks. Now the requirements of the second prototype are defined. Planning and designing the 
second prototype now begins followed by constructing and testing the second prototype. 
Therefore the spiral development model is a model where timelines are taken care of and the 
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product can be delivered as scheduled. This model is not usually understood well and 
development teams end up following the waterfall model, even though they claim that they 
used the spiral development model. That is, they develop a system one module at a time via 
the waterfall stages and consider the sequence of module development to be spiraling. In 
contrast, Boehm envisioned that the entire system would be iteratively refined in a holistic way 
(Boehm, 1986). 
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Figure 2. The spiral development model. Adapted from "A Spiral Model of Software 
Development and Enhancement” by Boehm, 1986. ACM SIGSOFT Software Engineering Notes, 
11(4):14-24, p. 16. 
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Capability Maturity Model Integration® (CMMI). Capability Maturity Model Integration 
(CMMI) is a process improvement approach that provides organizations with the essential 
elements of effective processes that ultimately improve their performance. CMMI was 
developed by a group of experts from industry, government, and the Software Engineering 
Institute (SEI) at Carnegie Mellon University. CMMI can be used to guide process improvement 
across a project, a division, or an entire organization. It helps to integrate traditionally separate 
organizational functions, set process improvement goals and priorities, provide guidance for 
quality processes, and provide a point of reference for appraising current processes.  
        In a CMMI appraisal, an organization is appraised and given a maturity or a capability 
level of 1-5 as seen in Figure 3. There are three classes of appraisals, namely A, B and C, 
focusing on identifying improvement opportunities and comparing the organization’s practices 
to the CMMI best practices. The appraising norms should conform to the Appraisal 
Requirements for CMMI (ARC) document. The ARC document defines the requirements 
considered essential to appraisal methods intended for use with CMMI models. Appraisal 
methods used in the ARC document may be applied for different purposes, including 
assessments for internal process improvement and capability evaluations for supplier selection 
and process monitoring.  
 
18 
 
Figure 3. CMMI maturity levels. Adapted from “What is CMMI?” by Godfrey, 2008. NASA 
presentation. 
 
        Additionally, The Standard CMMI Appraisal Method for Process Improvement (SCAMPI) 
is designed to provide benchmark quality ratings relative to CMMI models. It is applicable to a 
wide range of appraisal usage modes, including both internal process improvement and 
external capability determinations. SCAMPI also satisfies all the ARC requirements. The CMMI 
model framework can be seen in Table 2. 
 
 
19 
Table 2 
CMMI Framework 
Abbreviation Name Area Maturity Level 
REQM Requirements Management Engineering 2 
PMC Project Monitoring and Control Project Management 2 
PP Project Planning Project Management 2 
CM Configuration Management Support 2 
MA Measurement and Analysis Support 2 
PPQA Process and Product Quality assurance Support 2 
OPD Organizational Process Definition Process Management 3 
CAR Causal Analysis Support 5 
 
CMMI focuses on three areas of interest: 
 CMMI for Development (CMMI-DEV), addressing product and service development. 
 CMMI for Acquisition (CMMI-ACQ), addressing supply chain management, acquisition 
and outsourcing processes. 
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 CMMI for Services (CMMI-SVC), addressing delivery services within and out of the 
organization.  
The intended benefits from using CMMI include: 
 The organization's activities are explicitly linked to its business objectives.  
 Customers can be informed about various practices performed in the organization and 
their adherence to CMMI processes. 
 Increased visibility into the organization's activities which helps to ensure that the 
product or services provided meets the customer's expectations.  
 CMMI appraisal increases performances in the areas of cost, customer satisfaction, 
quality, productivity, and schedule.  
        Thus CMMI appraisals are based on whether the business and engineering processes 
specified by an organization are actually followed by that organization.  
        The systems engineering practices discussed above (waterfall model, spiral 
development model and CMMI) are formal models that reinforce a focus on managerial and 
technical aspects of a system such as technology development, schedule, and budget. These 
models do not help developers address or consider social and human aspects and they attempt 
to simplify and constrain complex problems and the simplification process runs counter to 
addressing social and human aspects. For example, Goguen explains requirements as being 
social, open and emergent, but the CMMI and waterfall models do not permit emergence of 
requirements or adaptation to changes, two critical processes that help handling complex 
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problems (Norman, 2004). Limitations such as these were highlighted in a study by Hoffman, 
Neville, and Fowlkes (2009) and will be discussed in the next section. 
Limitations of traditional approaches to quality assurance 
        Current engineering practices neglect relationships and dynamics among system 
elements in favor of a focus on individual system components. To study the importance such 
relationships between system elements, a cognitive task analysis (CTA) was conducted to study 
the work domain of IT systems development (Hoffman, Neville, & Fowlkes, 2009). 
Documentation analysis conducted as a part of the CTA involved examining over 50 documents 
on topics related to development and acquisition of IT.  Interviews were conducted in which six 
experienced systems and software engineers were asked about systems development 
challenges they had faced. Systems development challenges that emerged included difficulties 
in identifying user needs, coordination within development team, coping with complexity, 
budget and schedule, and most importantly, difficulty in accommodating changing information 
and requirements across the development effort. 
        The CTA highlighted the insidious effects of changing nature of requirements. The 
authors stated, “Traditional systems development paradigms require early requirements 
definition, and all software-writing activities flow from that. Subsequent changes in 
requirements often present “back to square one” situations, are therefore ignored or taken as 
evidence of poor requirements gathering.” The development teams must understand the 
emergent, open, contingent nature of requirements and the associated constraints. The 
authors suggest, “Requirements assessment should be an ongoing process across the 
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development effort, so that it detects ways in which practitioners adapt then work methods 
and new prototypes.” 
Systems Thinking Frameworks in Other Domains  
        The idea behind this research is to develop a framework that helps the system and 
software development teams to focus on both salient and less salient elements of a system 
including the technology components, humans in the system, system environment setting, the 
organizational and cultural values and practices, and the interfaces between components. The 
development of the system using a holistic approach is intended so that better quality systems 
can be engineered.  
The next section presents existing formal models that reinforce systems thinking and 
which therefore have had an influence in the development of a “systems thinking” framework 
for systems development. In the aviation domain, analysis of breakdowns in an organization 
can be particularly well understood by the “Swiss cheese” model proposed by Reason (Reason, 
1990), as seen in Figure 4. Reason’s model has served as the foundation for the Human Factors 
Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) framework, which is used in the aviation domain and 
also in the medical domain (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). After describing HFACS, a recent 
effort by Paletz, Bearman, Orasanu, and Holbrook (2009) to extend HFACS will be discussed. 
The third “systems thinking” framework to be discussed is Leveson’s (2009) Hierarchical 
Accident Model, which was used to evaluate the causal factors in a mission interruption of the 
Solar Heliospheric Observatory (SOHO) (Leveson, Lundqvist, Stringfellow, & Weiss, 2009). 
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Reason’s “Swiss Cheese” Model of human error causation. James Reason (1990) 
describes four levels of factors that can contribute to a system breakdown in the aviation 
industry (too often referred to as “human error”, a misnomer used by Reason as well) in the 
“Swiss Cheese” Model.   
 
Figure 4. The “Swiss Cheese” Model of human error causation. Adapted from “Human Error,” 
by Reason, 1990. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Reason presents four levels of an organization that contributes to an error, namely; 
Organizational influences, Unsafe supervision, Preconditions for unsafe acts, and Unsafe acts. 
According to Reason, factors at all levels of an organization contribute to an error, even though 
the error was committed at one particular level. Thus,  aircrew, maintainers, supervisors and 
management are involved in the causal factors leading to the accident/incident in aviation. The 
24 
first organizational level of Reason’s model, describes Unsafe Acts that refer to the aircrew 
errors that lead to an accident.  They are referred to as active failures because most causal 
factors are uncovered in this level. The latent failures refer to the actions and conditions that 
set stage for and make the accident possible. Categories of latent failures include 
organizational influences, unsafe supervision, and preconditions for unsafe acts. 
Organizational influences  describes factors such as political factors or fiscal factors that 
play a major role in shaping the organizational climate. Reason suggests that the organizational 
policies play a role in the causal sequence leading to a failure. Unsafe supervision, describes the 
inefficient supervision or inappropriate practices of the supervisors which might lead to a 
failure.  Preconditions for unsafe acts involve work conditions that foster mental fatigue and 
inefficient communication and coordination among the crew members and also between all the 
members of the organization.  
 Reason’s model guides the accident investigation processes by addressing all the levels in 
the organization in a causal sequence to failure and making the accident analyst look for causal 
factors in both the active and the latent levels of the organization. 
 
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System. “Human beings by their very nature 
make mistakes; therefore, it is unreasonable to expect error-free human performance” 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 1997). 
        Based on Reason’s (1990) “Swiss Cheese” model of system failures, the Human Factors 
Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), as seen in Figure 5, was developed. HFACS is useful 
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in accident investigation because it helps analysts consider the latent failures within a causal 
web of influences. The HFACS framework breaks down each level of the “Swiss Cheese” model 
into various categories thereby providing a wide range of causal factors to be considered and 
addressed for effective and efficient aviation accident investigation.  
 HFACS categorizes “Organizational Influences” into errors based on Resource 
Management, Organizational Climate, and Organizational Processes. Similarly “Unsafe 
Supervision” is classified into four categories: Inadequate Supervision, Planned Inappropriate 
Operations, Failure to Correct Problem, and Supervisory Violations. “Preconditions for Unsafe 
Acts” includes Environmental Factors, Conditions of Operators, and Personnel Factors.  
Environmental Factors again include Physical Environment and Technological Environment. 
Conditions of Operators includes Adverse Mental States, Adverse Physiological States, and 
Physical/Mental Limitations. Personnel Factors includes Crew Resource Management and 
Personal Readiness. “Unsafe Acts” is classified into two categories: Errors and Violations. Errors 
are again categorized into Skill-based Errors, Decision Errors, and Perceptual Errors. Violations 
on the other hand are categorized into Routine Violations and Exceptional Violations 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). 
 A comprehensive description of all the 19 causal categories described in HFACS can be 
seen in Appendix A. The HFACS framework provides the accident analysis investigators with a 
tool for comprehensively identifying and classifying the human causes of aviation accidents.  
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Figure 5. The HFACS framework. Adapted from “A human error approach to aviation accident 
analysis: The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System” by Wiegmann, and Shappell, 
2003, p. 71. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company. 
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        An application of HFACS can be seen in helicopter emergency medical service (HEMS), 
which plays a vital role in the U.S. health care industry. Since 1998, there has been a troubling 
increase in the number of accidents and fatalities associated with this group because of human 
related errors (Boquet et al., 2009). Like other aviation operations, skill-based errors comprised 
the majority of the unsafe acts, followed by decision errors, violations and perceptual errors. 
Accidents that involved violations were three times more likely to be associated with a fatality 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Thus HFACS was used to shed light on the human error involved 
in HEMS accidents, allowing for a greater description than is typically associated with standard 
reporting.  
        While the HFACS improves system failure classification is should be clear from the 
earlier arguments that social factors are neglected. Paletz, Bearman, Orasanu, and Holbrook 
(2009) introduced additional categories to the HFACS structure. Paletz et al. state, “Social 
psychological phenomena have long been known to influence attitudes and behavior but not 
been highlighted in accident investigation models.”The authors attempted to make the HFACS 
taxonomy more complete by identifying and including social factors that contribute to system 
breakdown. Social pressures contribute to poor decision making by leading the pilots to 
underestimate potential dangers (Paletz et al., 2009).  
Paletz et al. studied the consequence of social pressures on the pilots flying in Alaska, 
who often fly missions in adverse weather conditions and work within minimal infrastructure, 
and often provide others with basic necessities. They used the critical incident interviewing 
technique (Flanagan, 1954; Klein, Calderwood, & MacGregor, 1989) to interview 28 pilots who 
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were asked to describe a challenging decision situation involving weather when they were pilot 
in command. The interviews were audio-recorded and later transcribed. The initial coding was 
conducted in an iterative data driven, bottom-up fashion and resulted in the identification of 31 
pressures which were then coded into five categories (the first four categories were social 
psychological influences) namely: informational social influence, the foot-in-the-door persuasion 
technique, normalization of deviance, the internal self-motives of impression management and 
self-consistency, and other (included pressures which were not strictly social or psychological). 
The four social psychological influences are explained in Table 3. These categories (involving 
social psychological influences) were then grouped into themes based on HFACS, as seen in 
Figure 6 and Figure 7. 
Table 3 
Social Psychological Influences Assessed by Paletz et al. 
Social Psychological  
Influence 
Description 
Informational Social Influence 
Informational social science is a type of 
conformity, where a person look to others for 
cues concerning correct behavior when he/she 
is unsure of the correct way to behave. 
Foot-in-the-door Persuasion 
Technique 
Foot-in-the-door technique (FITD) is a 
compliance tactic that involves getting a person 
to agree to a large request by first setting them 
up by having them agree to a modest request.  
Normalization of Deviance 
(Progressive commitment) 
Normalization of Deviance is a phenomenon 
based on insidious small, progressive changes. 
It is an incremental acceptance of a 
progressively lower threshold, e.g., of safety, by 
a group of people. 
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Self-Motives: Impression 
Management and Self-Consistency 
People are motivated to act in ways that will 
earn them respect and social acceptance. On 
the other hand if their actions are conflicting 
with their beliefs, the person often tends to 
adjust their beliefs.  
 
 
Figure 6. Inclusion of self-motives and progressive commitment in the HFACS framework. 
Adapted from “Socializing the human factors analysis and classification system: Incorporating 
social psychological phenomena into a human factors error classification system,” by Paletz, 
Bearman, Orasanu, and Holbrook, 2009. Human Factors, 51, 435-445, p. 441. 
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Figure 7. Inclusion of self-motives and progressive commitment in the HFACS framework. 
Adapted from “Socializing the human factors analysis and classification system: Incorporating 
social psychological phenomena into a human factors error classification system,” by Paletz, 
Bearman, Orasanu, and Holbrook, 2009. Human Factors, 51, 435-445, p. 442. 
 
The Paletz et al. study enunciates the importance of social psychological phenomena in 
real flight operations and can be extended to pilots flying outside of Alaska. The author’s report 
that these factors are generally over-looked in accident investigations and that existing accident 
reports do not serve as a good source to study the role of social and psychological phenomena 
in accidents. The Paletz et al. study was therefore important in that they attempted to include 
rare pressures in HFACS to highlight the possible role of these social psychological factors in 
accidents.  
The Hierarchical Accident Model.   Another accident analysis model designed to help 
analysts consider a comprehensive range of factors is the Hierarchical Accident Model, 
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developed by Nancy Leveson (2009). The Hierarchical accident model was used to evaluate the 
contributing factors in a mission interruption of the Solar Heliospheric Observatory (SOHO) 
(Leveson, Lundqvist, Stringfellow, & Weiss, 2009), which was a joint effort between the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the European Space Agency (ESA). 
The SOHO launch took place on December 2, 1995, and the vehicle performed helioseismology 
and monitored the solar atmosphere, corona and winds. According to Leveson et al. (2009), a 
simple chain of events model is inadequate for analyzing accidents in complex systems. Leveson 
et al. advocated the addition of a hierarchical abstraction that expands the types of 
contributing factors considered. Three levels of hierarchical abstraction were used in the SOHO 
accident analysis. Level 1 describes the mechanism of the accident, that is, the chain of events. 
Level 2 includes the conditions that allowed the events in the first level to occur. Level 3 
includes the factors referred to as the root causes or systemic errors. Systemic errors include: 
 Flaws in the safety culture, which include overconfidence and complacency, not 
understanding software risks, inadequate emphasis on risk management, and incorrect 
prioritization of changes.  
 Ineffective organizational changes, which include diffusion of responsibility and authority, 
absence of a system safety program, limited communication channels, and poor 
information flow. 
  Ineffective technical activities, which includes flawed or inadequate review process, 
inadequate specifications, inadequate software or systems engineering, inadequate system 
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safety engineering, simulation environments not matching operational environments, and 
inadequate cognitive engineering and feedback.  
       The hierarchical accident model was also used to identify systemic factors in Ariane 5 and 
Titan IVB-32 accidents. Similarities in the systemic factors in the three of the above mentioned 
accidents, including the SOHO mission interruption, can be used to develop prevention 
strategies for avoiding future accidents.  
Premise Underlying this Research. The above discussions shed light on different kinds 
of frameworks used in accident investigation and illustrate their job of bringing to light a 
number of contributing factors and conditions leading to an accident. These factors can then be 
used in an organization to understand their influence better, discourage the negative and 
encourage the positive factors, and look out for them in the future to avoid accidents. By 
focusing attention to a comprehensive set of latent and conspicuous factors, including pre-
conditions to an accident or an undesirable situation, the influence of preconceptions, 
tendency to premature closure (i.e. making decisions early), and other biases may be reduced. 
The framework helps the organization to improve the quality of their work and product.    
        Thus, the premise underlying this research is that software and systems development 
project teams will benefit from a similar type of framework that helps them attend to all key 
elements of the system being developed and associated engineering activities. The framework 
may also help an organization develop and nurture the various engineering activities to develop 
quality teams, efficient teamwork, and hence improve quality in their work. In particular, a 
comprehensive systems development framework could help organizations attend not just to 
technical, budget, and schedule factors but also to human and social factors as a part of the 
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development work and engineering activities. In other words, the present work is a first step 
towards a tool that should foster systems thinking in systems development. 
Approach 
        In a recent issue of the journal Systems Engineering, authors Valerdi and Davidz (2009) 
lament the lack of empirical research in the field of systems engineering. They suggest that four 
challenges have, in particular, discouraged researchers from tackling systems engineering 
topics: the immaturity of the field of systems engineering, a lack of appreciation for empirical 
social science research that is qualitative in nature, a lack of access to data from systems 
engineering teams, which operate in real-world settings over extended periods of time, and a 
lack of accepted measures of quality in systems engineering. 
        This empirical research was conducted to develop a framework for systems 
development. An ethnographic approach was used for data collection and analysis. The 
approach was ethnographic in that data obtained using naturalistic methods were assessed to 
learn about systems engineering culture, challenges, and factors that influence engineering 
activities.  
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Method 
Overview 
         In this systems engineering research project, transcripts of semi-structured interviews 
with engineers were analyzed for the purpose of developing a framework that can improve 
quality in systems engineering the way HFACS framework has been used to improve safety in 
aviation. The framework developed in this research effort is expected to serve as a foundation 
that can be revised and built upon in future efforts.                                      
        Methods advocated by Valerdi and Davidz (2009) for studying systems engineering 
include semi-structured and unstructured interviews, qualitative research methods that are 
popular because of the rich and relatively unbiased (i.e., less influenced by the researcher) data 
they typically produce. Data used in the present study were collected using a semi-structured 
interview method referred to as Critical Decision Method (CDM, Flanagan, 1954; Klein, 
Calderwood, & MacGregor, 1989). The CDM is a procedure for gathering practitioner 
knowledge used to detect, respond to, and navigate difficult events. This technique was used 
by Paletz et al. in their study, which was discussed earlier. 
        In a CDM, the interviewee recalls and describes a specific memorable past event in 
detail. By relying on the recall of specific memorable past events, the researcher can collect 
data grounded in actual experience rather than introspective, generalized reports. Data 
collected using the CDM were broken down into data elements/chunks, which were coded. 
Patterns in the data were noted with respect to the situation and a hypothesis, or grounded 
theory, was formulated. This is consistent with Grounded Theory Research. Grounded Theory 
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Research is a qualitative research approach where data are collected and evaluated before 
hypotheses are derived (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Each hypothesis, or theory, derived from the 
data was validated using investigator triangulation (Johnson, 1997), a strategy used to promote 
qualitative research validity where multiple researchers interpret the collected data. Another 
strategy used to bolster validity is maintaining a link between findings and data in its raw form 
to the extent possible.  Maintaining this link allows readers to judge researcher interpretations 
of the data. 
 Semi-structured interview data were analyzed for this project. The semi-structured 
interview data analyzed for this project were collected by Hoffman, Neville, and Fowlkes (2009). 
Hoffman et al. analyzed these data to identify challenges faced by systems development teams; 
in the present work, the data were re-analyzed to identify systems development goals, 
activities, challenges, characteristics, and factors that affect quality of the systems thinking in 
systems development organizations. 
Participants 
 Hoffman et al. conducted semi-structured interviews with six systems development 
practitioners. Four were trained as software engineers and two were trained as systems 
engineers. Five had 20 years or more of experience and one had 15 years of experience.  
Knowledge elicitation approach. Each engineer was asked to recall a challenging and 
memorable engineering project and talk through it. Three of the engineers were asked to 
describe day-to-day activities. The three other engineers answered a set of open-ended 
questions, as seen in Appendix B, about team structure, goals, activities, and processes.  The 
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projects chosen by the engineers are described in Table 4. Interviews were approximately 2 hrs 
in duration. Interview data were audio recorded; audio recordings were subsequently 
transcribed.  
Table 4 
Characteristics of the System Development Projects Described by the Participants  
Employer Project team Role in team Project Goal 
Major  
Corporation 
Medium-large; three 
to four teams of 
three to five people; 
multiple 
organizations. 
Systems engineer 
as overall technical 
lead 
Over 18 months, develop a 
demonstration of an upgraded 
legacy training system 
Major  
Corporation 
Small-medium; two 
team leads; two to 
five people per team 
Software engineer 
as team lead 
Over 2 months within a 2-year 
project, develop a control 
system that ties the "blocks" 
together and interfaces with 
20 legacy messaging protocols 
Major  
Corporation 
Large; three to four 
teams of seven to 
ten people; multiple 
organizations 
System engineer as 
team lead 
During 12 years of a two 
decade acquisition program, 
work on proposals and a 
simulation tested for early 
testing of integration among 
system components 
Small   
Business 
 Small-medium; one 
team of seven to 
nine people 
Lead software 
engineer 
Over 3 years, develop a 
decision support tool for 
helicopter crews. 
University Medium-large; two 
to five people in each 
of four to five teams 
Software engineer 
as team lead 
As part of ongoing 
maintenance and evolution of 
a web based library service, 
port the system from Unix to 
Linux, over a six-month period 
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Small  
Business 
Medium; two to four 
people in each of 
three to four teams 
Software engineer 
as overall technical 
lead 
Continuously evolve a 
multipurpose command-and-
control system 
Note. Adapted from “Using cognitive task analysis to explore issues in the procurement of intelligent decision 
support systems,” by Hoffman, Neville, and Fowlkes, 2009. Cognition, Technology, and Work, 11, 57-70. 
 
Data Analysis 
        To code the data, the element of analysis was defined. These elements were individual 
sentences or chunks of narrative that express a single idea or concept; examples can be seen in 
Table 5. The data elements were coded twice: using data-driven codes and using codes from 
the HFACS framework.  
Coders. Multiple coders (three in number; Coder A, Coder B, and Coder C) were trained 
to code the data. Coder A performed both the data-driven coding and coding using the HFACS 
categories, Coder B performed the data-driven coding and Coder C performed the HFACS 
coding. Coder A was “HFACS certified.” He completed a HFACS super-user training seminar. To 
train for the data-driven coding, coders A and B performed four iterations of coding. They 
coded a subset of the data each time and then convened to compare codes and to develop a 
shared understanding of the codes. To train for the HFACS based coding, Coder C reviewed 
HFACS articles and performed two iterations of coding followed by feedback from Coder A. 
Data-driven coding. Data analysis methods focused on identifying patterns and 
relationships in the data. The data were first reviewed broadly to identify themes and possible 
patterns and relationships. An initial set of data-driven codes were developed based on the 
initial review and were used to code the data. More codes evolved during the second and third 
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iterations of reviewing the data, and by going through relevant literature. Using the data-driven 
coding approach, data elements were iteratively coded in a bottom-up, or data-driven, manner 
by Coders A and B.  
Table 5 
Interview Transcripts as Data Elements 
  
When data could not be coded using the existing codes, new codes were proposed and 
introduced into the coding process. The codes developed by Coder B were handed over to 
Coder A to compare against his set of codes. Coder A reconciled differences and produced the 
final set of codes. 
HFACS coding. The top-down approach involved coding the data elements with HFACS 
categories. A subset of high-level HFACS categories was identified as potentially relevant to 
systems thinking and systems development. These categories were used to code the data and 
are listed in Table 6. HFACS categories such as “Preconditions for Unsafe Acts”, “Unsafe Acts”, 
and “Unsafe Supervision” are not clearly relevant to systems thinking in the systems 
development domain and so were not used as codes. Coder C handed over their codes to Coder 
Data Elements 
At <my company>, they have extensive processes.  That has to do with the CMMI thing.   
 
 
And we’re a level 4 wanting to become a level 5 
 
 
Especially at level 5, that’s the highest.  When you’re at that level...there’re benefits to it, but 
there are some frustrations with it, too at times.  
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A to check for corroboration between the codes. Coder A reconciled the differences and 
decided on the finalized set of codes to be included in the framework. 
Table 6 
Categories of HFACS Used to Code Data  
HFACS Categories Activities involved within the category 
Resource Management 
Resource management deals with managing budget  
resources and excessive cost cutting.  
Organizational Climate 
Organizational climate includes: organizational structure  
dealing with chain of command, delegation of authority,  
and the communication channels present within the chain of  
command; and organizational culture which includes  
organizational customs, values, beliefs, attitudes, norms, and  
rules. 
Organizational Process 
Organizational processes includes managing schedules,  
procedures adopted to meet standards, and risk management 
Note. Adapted from “A human error approach to aviation accident analysis: The human factors analysis and 
classification system,” by Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003.  Aldershot, Great Britain: Ashgate Publishing Company. 
 
Three examples of coded data elements coded using HFACS categories are shown in 
Table 7. Appendix C presents a set of example data elements and assigned codes.  
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Table 7 
Examples of Data Elements Coded Using HFACS Categories 
Coder A 
codes 
Coder C 
codes 
Final 
codes 
Data Elements 
Organizational 
Process 
Organizational 
Process 
Organizational 
Process 
At <my company>, they have 
extensive processes.  That has to do 
with the CMMI thing. 
Organizational 
Climate  
Organizational 
Climate 
Organizational 
Climate 
Team was a relatively large group 
and was a changing group 
Organizational 
Climate  
Organizational 
Process  
Organizational 
Climate  
From the company's point of view 
it's tougher because there are so 
many people on a project it is 
tougher to tie you to the 
performance of the project and it's 
much more subjective. 
 
Reliability assessment. To assess the reliability of coding, the percent of 
correspondence between codes assigned by coders in each pair was determined. The process 
adopted to calculate percent of correspondence between the coding pairs can be seen in 
Appendix D. This process was again used to calculate the percent of correspondence between 
coders in the HFACS based coding process. 
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Results and Discussion 
Correspondence Between Coders 
The percent of shared codes for each of the six interviews can be seen in Table 8. Coders 
A and B had 74.71% of data-driven codes in common, and Coders A and C had 81.81% of HFACS 
codes in common.  
Table 8 
Correspondence Percentages 
 
Coders 
A-B 
Coders 
A-C 
Interview Transcript 
Data-Driven 
(Bottom-up) 
HFACS 
(Top-down) 
A 58.50% 73.07% 
B 64.66% 84.15% 
C 73.94% 85.70% 
D 94.87% 84.60% 
E 95.00% 96.67% 
F 61.37% 66.67% 
      
Average 74.71% 81.81% 
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Data-Driven Coding 
The initial set of codes obtained following a data-driven approach is shown in Table 9. 
Table 9 
Initial Set of Codes 
Technical Issues Social Issues 
   Coordinate Multiple Companies    Team Change Impacts    Team Coordination  
   Requirements Emerge    Superior Personnel Pressures    Work pressure 
   Coordinate Multiple Teams    Organizational Structure Effects    Communication 
Issues 
   Resist Changes    Team Structure/Size Issues    Consensus Issues 
   Management Culture Issues    Configuration Management 
    Political Factors    Timeline Pressures 
    Systems Development Process 
Effects 
   Defective Future Plan 
    Budget Constraints    System Testing/Evaluation 
Issues 
    Company Law Constraints    Superior Company Dominance 
    Customer Issues    Resource Issues 
    Present Market Demand Effects    Requirements to Code 
Transformation  
   Issues 
    Management Change Effects    Pressures from Smaller 
Companies 
 
   System Integration Issues    Project Management Issues 
    Procedural Issues    System Complexity Issues 
    Quality Assessment Method 
issues     
 
These initial codes were grouped into higher level categories which are: 
 Systems development team 
 Systems development project management 
  Systems development technical activities  
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 External pressures 
 Initial codes that did not map well to the data were dropped and replaced by codes that 
captured the content of the interviews. Dropped initial codes consist of: 
 Resistance to change 
 Management culture issues 
 Company law constraints 
 Management change effects 
 Procedural issues 
 Team-change impacts 
 Resource issues 
 Requirements to code transformation issues 
The entire set of final codes is included as factors in the framework, as long as they 
mapped to data in at least one interview. Codes that mapped to data elements in only one or 
two of the interviews were flagged. These flagged codes were kept along with the codes 
receiving stronger support because weak evidence for them in this particular study does not 
disprove their relevance to systems engineering. Future research can shed more light on their 
potential roles and, in the meantime, their inclusion in the framework may enrich the 
framework’s support for systems thinking. The codes which had weak support were: 
 Acquire Domain Knowledge (Used to code four data elements in one interview) 
 Team Member Characteristics (Used to code two data elements in one interview) 
 Contracting (Used to code nineteen data elements in two of the interviews) 
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The data contained a great deal of information regarding teamwork. Teamwork 
taxonomies by Marks, Mathieu, and Zaccaro (2001) and Smith-Jentsch, Zeisig, Acton, and 
McPherson (1998), seen in Appendix E and F respectively, were identified and used to perform 
a “finer-grained” analysis on teamwork. From this teamwork analysis, the codes that mapped 
well to the data and found relevant to systems development are as follows: 
 Mission Analysis and Planning 
 Goal Specification 
 Team Monitoring and Back-up Behavior 
 Coordination 
 Conflict Management 
 Initiative 
 Information Exchange 
The final set of codes including their descriptions, can be seen in Appendix G.  These 
codes or factors, and their organization in this initial proposed framework will be discussed in 
the section below. 
The Systems Thinking Framework (STF) 
The proposed Systems Thinking Framework (STF) consists of four tiers namely, 
organizational influences, project management, team processes and technical activities. Each 
tier has a set of factors associated with it. The external pressures factor envelops all the tiers. 
Factors that were minimally supported by data (factors used only in one or two of the six 
interviews) are outlined using dashed lines.  
45 
The hierarchical representation of the STF shown in Figure 8 specifies four major 
sources of influence on the technical activities, which is in the lowest tier. These influences are 
changes and associated pressures in the external environment, organizational characteristics, 
project management activities, and teamwork strategies. These sources of influences are 
organized in the framework according to the extent to which they interface directly with and 
directly impact the technical activities. The structure represents the way in which different 
layers of an organization can influence the way work is conducted, a concept borrowed from 
the HFACS framework.  
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Figure 8. The STF structure. Note. Dashed lines around nodes indicate that a factor was found 
only in one or two of the interviews. All the other factors were found in at least three of the 
interviews. 
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Each of the STF tiers will be discussed below. The discussion will focus on the high-level 
factors in each tier. The lower level factors are defined in Appendix B.  
Organizational influences. The top tier, Organizational Influences, as seen in Figure 9, 
consists of factors from HFACS that were found to be relevant to systems development. The 
factors within this tier can be seen in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Factors in the Organizational influences tier. Note. The factor indicated by ** indicates 
a factor with weak support. 
Development philosophy deals with philosophies, strategies advocated by the 
organization for development and acquisition processes, and their influences on the system 
development process. For example, one engineer, when discussing about the systems 
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development processes and lifecycles, stated “I don’t like very long development cycles. I prefer 
shorter development cycles that involves developing in groups and components and testing 
those.” Another engineer, when asked about the systems development process used in the 
project he was describing, stated, “We used object-oriented programming.” 
The development philosophy adopted can affect the organizational processes and 
procedures involved in a systems development effort. The system development process 
adopted in a particular effort, should take into consideration the allocated budget and the time 
for project submission, which are usually specified in the contractual requirements. 
Organizational climate refers to the working environment and factors within the 
organization that influence worker performance, such as the organization’s structure, 
delegation of authority and responsibility, communication channels, openness to feedback, and 
rigidity of processes. An organization’s policies and culture echo its climate. An engineer, for 
example, stated, “The other lead and I had been introduced to everyone. We had a lot of 
autonomy. The buck stopped with us. The managers were clueless. We, the two leads, had 
decent trust and a decent rapport.” A healthy organizational climate should nurture mutual 
respect and a healthy interaction between management and the technical personnel. Attention 
to organizational climate factors could lead to changes in organizational policies that would 
promote better teamwork and improve the quality of the product developed by the team. 
Organizational process refers to the business decisions and rules that guide and 
determine the day to day activities and processes that take place in an organization.  As an 
example, CMMI standards require an organization to follow a set or procedures.  An engineer, 
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describing about CMMI, reported, “We have a project plan, test plans, schedules, etc., that are 
required by CMMI.” The engineer added, “The formalities are difficult.” Procedures that 
influence the day to day activities might prove burdensome to the development teams. 
Frequent checks and calibrations on the organizational processes would help the teams to 
perform better. 
Project management. The project managers should have a good awareness about the 
complete systems development project. For example, one engineer reported “I’m the lead 
person on this one project, and I probably have the best picture of this whole system.” Project 
management influences the efficient working of the development team and hence the 
production of quality products. A team lead said “I hated the Program Managers that didn’t 
understand anything about what they were trying to build.” The development team’s 
understanding of the processes involved in the systems development project might be affected 
if the project manager’s knowledge of the domain is inefficient. The activities performed by a 
project manager needs to be continuously checked. Thus, as an influence on the activities 
performed by the development team, project management will be discussed below. 
The second tier, project management, as seen in Figure 10, is composed of quality 
management, customer and user expectations management, complexity management, 
development team selection and contracting.  
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Figure 10. System development project management 
 Quality management activities in this framework involve risk management and 
configuration management. Risk management deals with risk identification, assessment, and 
prioritization; strategies adopted to manage risks; and the employment of resources in 
response to unexpected events. Configuration management deals with documenting 
requirements, changes in design, and operational information throughout a system’s lifecycle. 
It is well known that improper documentation and management of the emerging requirements 
increases the risk of a flawed design and development process and consequently contributes to 
the development of a poor quality product and low customer satisfaction.  
Talking about quality management, an engineer reported, “We’d do a mockup and the 
business side would give feedback… we’d do a couple of iterations of this depending on the 
complexity.” Poor quality management can increase the workload of the development team, 
and lead to situations where the budget and schedule have not been met, thereby leading to 
failed systems development efforts. The importance of efficient planning of budget and 
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schedule was also seen in the earlier discussion of “CHAOS REPORT,” where both budget and 
schedule were the criteria behind a project’s success or a failure.  
 Managing changes in customer expectations and demands can be vital for a successful 
systems development project. The activities performed by the systems development team 
depend on the requirements of the customer. A project manager should effectively 
communicate with the customers and address their expectations. For example, an engineer 
stated, “People playing this role need to speak user and systems domains. It should be 
someone who understands how software is designed, coded and built.”  
 Development team selection is another aspect for project management. An engineer, 
describing about the development team in his organization, stated, “Within the team, people 
were specialized but able to take over if someone was out.” The work done by the development 
teams need to be regularly assessed by the project manager. 
Complexity management, dealing with complexity of the system development work, 
complexity of the system and its infrastructure, and strategies adopted to cope with 
complexity, is another factor that might affect the work performed by the development team. 
The complexity of a systems development project can be increased by changing customer 
expectations, bigger development teams, poor configuration management, complex system 
designs, time pressures, and workload pressures etc. Involving customers and getting their 
feedback during the design and development process would help the development teams cope 
with changing requirements. For example an engineer, describing about increasing complexity 
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because of changing customer requirements, stated, “We talk to the customer and do a post-
mortem with them… As programs get bigger, change is more painful.”  
Contracting deals with policies and decisions regarding contract agreements. For 
example, en engineer reported, “So we were on the F-22 team which ended up winning out of 
the prototyping phase, they actually built two planes. Prototyped them, and then ours got 
selected for doing electronic warfare.” The contract agreements will usually decide the budget 
and schedule allocated for a particular project. The systems development team should be 
aware of these contract agreements to plan the design and development of the product. 
Periodic checks could be used to ensure if the project manager is aware of and attending to the 
contract details. 
Team processes. The third tier of the framework Team processes, as seen in Figure 11 , 
is composed of communication and coordination, conflict management, mission analysis and 
planning, team monitoring and back-up behavior, and building common ground and 
awareness.. Team processes deal with various strategies the team members use to coordinate 
to accomplish a task effectively. The interview data contained a great deal of information 
regarding teamwork. Teamwork taxonomies by Marks, Mathieu, and Zaccaro (2001) and Smith-
Jentsch, Zeisig, Acton, and McPherson (1998), seen in Appendix C and D respectively, were used 
to assess the teamwork related data. The data tended to relate to conflicts, tensions, team 
monitoring, information exchange, and shared understanding among team members, focused 
on technical aspects of a system.  
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In general, the importance of team processes tends to be neglected by the systems 
engineering community.  
 
Figure 11. Team processes 
 Communication and coordination refer to communicating information in order to 
coordinate task sequences and timing. An example of interview data related to this factor is, 
“has to be communication at some point between software and cognitive systems engineers so 
that neither diverges too far from the other or that the application is headed towards the 
unusable.” An engineer, in response to solving a problem due to poor communication amongst 
team members, said “Usually, if there was a communication breakdown, the person’s 
understanding of the problem would be sent out by email, detailing the problem to everyone 
involved, followed by a meeting.” 
Conflict management involves strategies adapted to deal with conflicts; preemptive, 
which aims to prevent, control, or guide situation to preempt possible conflict, and reactive, 
which involves working through task-related and interpersonal agreements among team 
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members. The interviews suggested that internal conflicts are prevalent within the 
development team. For example, an engineer stated, “We always had conflict with the 
operations people.” Another engineer, when asked about possible conflicts between 
development teams, said “Between functional and implementation teams. I’ve had quite a few. 
This is a common one.”  
Mission analysis and planning deals with the interpretation and evaluation of the team’s 
purpose, identification of main tasks, assessment of available resources, detection and 
response to changes in operative environment. It also involves Identification and prioritization 
of goals for mission accomplishment. For example, an engineer describing about systems 
development planning processes reported, “There was a simulation working group. So it had a 
representative from the X system, from the radar system, from Company Y. And we met once a 
quarter sometimes more often. And a lot of them were out of where Company Y was. So we 
had quite a few meetings as a group to say ok, we had to agree on this fidelity of this simulator 
and how we were going to interface it and how they were going to structure this. So there were 
a lot of meetings to discuss that and try to work those things out. So then we would all work 
together when it was final.” 
Mission analysis also involves advocating a specific source of action, identifying team 
priorities, and assigning tasks. For example, an engineer stated, “So the first thing they wanted 
to do was before any of the other software was built, because they also did the build approach, 
they said we want you to build a simulator, that’s going to simulate all of your interfaces.” 
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Team monitoring and Back-up behavior involves cross-checking or monitoring 
teammates for the purpose of assisting proactively, and providing/requesting assistance. 
Talking about the importance of regularly assessing the work of development teams, an 
engineer reported, “I think code reviews that are very beneficial, they are also called peer 
reviews, is a more generic name. You can peer review a document, or code, or hardware 
design. So there are many peer reviews all the way through the steps. I’ve seen that work very 
well.” 
Building common ground and awareness involves updating and educating the team 
members about the day to day processes in the organization, changes in requirements, changes 
in development methods, and creating awareness about contractual requirements like budget 
and schedule. For example an engineer reported that they “taught one another new 
technologies for knowledge transfer.” Efficient communication and coordination can bring 
about common ground with respect to system development activities and plans. One engineer 
stated “At the end of every week, the leads made a report of goals, deadlines, and activities 
from the past week. They gave this to supervisors and distributed among team members. We 
used verbal communication to clarify, and this kept us pretty well informed. We were 
responsible for day to day operations and the supervisor needed to know. This is how we 
communicated concerns and needs to others and tied together teams.”  
Technical activities. The last tier of the framework Technical activities, as seen in Figure 
12, includes requirement allocation and management, designing and developing the system 
architecture, testing and evaluation process, integration of the components, and deployment.  
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Figure 12. System development technical activities 
 
Requirements management involves methods adopted to deal with the identification of 
requirements, communication and allocation of requirements, and management of changing 
requirements. Also involved are the problems faced in these methods. An engineer while 
talking about requirements stated, “It’s basically your high level system requirements. So we 
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going to get it. Set all their expectations. And from there we started to drive our system 
Technical 
Activities 
Requirements 
Management 
   
Requirements 
Development 
   
Requirements 
Allocation 
    
Design and 
Development Testing and 
Evaluation 
Integration 
and 
Interfacing 
Deployment 
   Integration with 
operational 
environment 
   Maintenance 
 
Acquire 
Domain 
Knowledge 
57 
architecture that we were going to put in place for phase 1.” Lack of user input, incomplete 
requirements, and ineffective management of changing requirements could result in 
development of a product with lesser functionality and therefore lack of customer satisfaction. 
This necessitates the practice of monitoring the requirements regularly. 
Design and development of the system includes the development process used; design 
criteria, strategies and methods adopted; and issues dealt with during the process. McConnell 
(1996, p. 63) states, “Design serves as the foundation for construction, project scheduling, 
project tracking, and project control, and as such effective design is essential to achieving 
maximum development speed.”An example given by an engineer, “And, you know, we were 
trying to define the architecture at the same time we were capturing the requirements, cause 
we had the first spiral drop we were trying to meet. So we were trying to get that core 
infrastructure and architecture in place such that we could meet that first delivery.” Here the 
engineer demonstrates the design and development process adopted. The requirements were 
collected through the design and development phase, and the team was trying to meet the 
schedule requirements. 
Testing and evaluation refers to testing methods employed and issues related with 
testing and evaluation. Referring to the testing processes involved in his system development 
process, an engineer stated, “They wanted to do that testing. And so that’s one of the areas 
where I got quite involved. We ended up having to develop these very complicated procedures 
and stuff to try to do something similar to that but never did match the real plans we had. So 
that is where we kind of went a different path and had to come up with these work-arounds to 
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do the actual testing.” Testing is necessary to be done regularly to evaluate the developments 
in the design process and check if the design requirements and the contractual requirements 
are being met. Based on the results of testing and evaluation, decision makers can assess a 
system’s readiness to advance to the next phase of development, risk reduction, and 
requirements refinement.  
Integration and interfacing includes issues related to integration of system components 
like hardware, software and related processes. For example, one of the engineers, describing 
the importance of system integration, reported, “Well that was the goal of the whole system. 
What I worked on was an early delivery of that where we just did the interfaces to try to make 
sure that all worked out. And then builds would actually be with the pilot. But yes it was early 
integration.” Another engineer stated, “No tearing down the house to rebuild with new 
materials—our materials were so different. We had to understand how parts do their thing to 
support interfaces between parts.” In the above quote, the engineer reports the importance of 
early analysis of interfaces between various system elements and how they have to be 
integrated. Integration of system elements need to be monitored regularly to avoid the risk of 
incompatibility of system elements which might lead to an overshoot of budget and schedule. 
Proper documentation of the requirements, design reviews, coordination and timely 
integration of the system elements may be useful to reduce the risk of incompatibility of all the 
system elements at the time of review. 
Deployment deals with issues that arise when the product is being delivered and 
deployed at the operational environment. As an example, an engineer reported, “The first 
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phase was developing these prototypes. The second one was developing the full plane. And I 
just saw on the news the other day they have delivered the second full squadron of those 
planes. We were developing the real thing the air force would use, the true final product. That’s 
why it is called the actual manufacturing stage. Where out of that they start producing the 
planes.” Through this quote the engineer suggests that the delivery of the final product to the 
customers is absolutely vital as it decides whether the product is satisfactory to the customers 
and that if the company can manufacture more products. 
Deployment also includes maintenance, integration with the operational environment, 
and ease of usability by users. Blanchard and Fabrycky (2011) state, “Traditionally, systems are 
designed and developed, tested to ensure compliance with the initially specified contractual 
requirements, delivered to the customer for operational use, and then often forgotten” (p. 
166).They suggest that the complete maintenance cycle, supply support provisions, and 
warehousing requirements are also important factors that need to be considered. 
Acquiring domain knowledge involves acquiring knowledge about the project and the 
product and a thorough understanding of the processes. Referring to domain knowledge an 
engineer stated, “We’d just jointed the railroad legacy. There was catch up in domain 
knowledge (i.e., the preceding/legacy system). The domain knowledge is what’s difficult. We 
trusted that the manager’s view of the domain is accurate. He told us about the domain by 
outlining system requirements: ‘here’s what the old system did and here’s what the new must 
do.’ We were sitting there with a whiteboard, passing around books…domain books were 
heaped on us—e.g., about vendor’s automatic braking systems and messaging protocols.” The 
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engineer describes the process of educating the team members about the product and 
customer requirements. He reports that the development team believes that the project 
manager has adequate knowledge about the system and contractual requirements.  
Regular monitoring and assessment of the work done by the development team, regular 
meetings to promote effective communication among the team and with the customers, 
thorough understanding of the project, processes involved, the customer requirements, and 
knowledge about integration of the end product might help the systems development team to 
perform efficient tasks. 
External pressures. External pressures, as seen in the framework, envelopes all the tiers 
and influence the system development team. For example, in an organization trying to meet 
CMMI standards, the project managers and development team are pressured by the high level 
management to do quality work efficiently enough to meet their high standards. For example, 
one engineer reported “We have a project plan, test plans, schedules, etc. that are required by 
CMMI.” He again stated, “In a fire drill, the formalities are difficult; we have adapted 
lightweight versions of the processes. Done incorrectly, CMMI can kill your program.” Another 
engineer said “Especially at level 5, that’s the highest.  When you’re at that level...there’re 
benefits to it, but there are some frustrations with it, too at times.” Through this quote, the 
engineer describes about the increased pressures to meet CMMI standards. Regular checks and 
calibrations have to be performed to monitor the work done by the development team and 
check whether the processes associated with meeting an industrial standard is met.  
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The next section will discuss about some of the problems dealt by the engineers, from 
all the six interviews taken together, in their respective systems development project, and 
which may affect the activities performed by the development team and could possibly lead to 
a system development failure.  
Factors to look out for.  Two engineers describing about problems related to managing 
requirements, reported about the problems arising due to ambiguous language used in 
documentation. One of them states “Use cases are problematic because they are ambiguous 
with respect to language”, and the other stated “Well some of the big things are the English 
language, if you write out a requirement and you can word it out and it sounds perfect to you, 
it gets the point across, someone else can read that and just get a totally different spin on it.” A 
solution to this problem could be face to face communication with the customers. For example 
one engineer reported “We would find out what the requirements were through just face to 
face discussion.” 
One engineer, talking about change management, reported “For almost all systems, the 
number one risk is change. No software systems start with a set of requirements and that’s 
what’s done. True requirements are said to be impossible to attain.” Another engineer said “As 
programs get bigger, change is more painful.” Suggestions to deal with change include - 
effective change management, understanding the emergent nature of the requirements, 
effective configuration management, and effective interaction with the customers. An engineer 
reported “Requirements creep during the development cycle. A lot of it is necessary, but it 
should be limited. You have to have someone act as a liaison between people setting 
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requirements and the developers. My supervisor was the liaison and people high up the 
company set requirements—pretty general requirements for the most part.” 
 In an interview, talking about the “Design and Development,” factor in the “Technical 
Activities” tier, an engineer stated, “The main problem is that people try to develop quickly 
without thinking through the ramifications.  Then there is the other extreme—spending too 
much time on the design. The middle ground is to narrow down to only those features and 
requirements that are necessary, but also putting quality into the software. Use use-cases to 
cover the various things that might happen,” is a serious problem encountered in systems 
development. He again stated “You can’t build in enough to address everything that might 
happen. Try to limit the scope of the project by accounting for the most likely problems with 
the first build. If things come up later you do have to take care of them.” 
 The section below will discuss about the framework’s attention to the human aspects of 
the system. 
Encouraging Attention to Human Aspects of Systems.  A main goal behind developing 
the systems thinking framework was to help developers attend to the large number of factors 
that can influence the outcome of their work and, especially, the factors that can influence how 
well a development team attends to social aspects of systems and to the integration of social 
and technical aspects. To this end, framework factors that can contribute directly to the 
integration of social and technical aspects have been identified post hoc. These factors consist 
of ‘Acquire Domain Knowledge’ on the ‘Technical Activities’ tier, all teamwork strategies 
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identified under ‘Team Processes’, and the factor ‘Complexity Management’ under the ‘Project 
Management’ tier. Justification for selecting these particular factors is as follows: 
Acquire Domain Knowledge – Acquiring domain knowledge is a type of technical work 
that involves learning about the environment and activities in which a system will be 
used. Acquiring domain knowledge is essential to both understanding the human 
aspects of a system and integrating them with the technical aspects. This component of 
systems development is where Goguen’s recommendations for using 
ethnomethodology can be brought to bear. 
Teamwork strategies – In the interviews, teamwork strategies were typically cited as 
supporting teamwork among development team members as they worked on a 
system’s technical components; the same strategies could facilitate teamwork between 
members working on technical and human components of a system. Because people 
working on technical and human system aspects often are trained in different disciplines 
guided by differing systems development philosophies, the teamwork strategies may be 
especially valuable—even vital—to the success of their working relationships. 
Complexity Management - Complexity management encompasses strategies that are 
used to either reduce or cope with the complexity of a system being developed or of the 
systems development process. When the human aspects of a system are considered, 
their consideration tends to introduce a great deal of complexity into the development 
process and those aspects furthermore represent complexity that is often ignored 
within the system being developed. Consequently, complexity management activities 
may be critical to the success of a team that addresses a system’s human elements. 
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In fact, the interview data did not address human aspects of systems or human-
technology integration, with very few exceptions. Similarly, the interviewees tended not to 
relate the three factors listed above to human-technology integration. For example, a domain 
analysis of the environment and activities in which a system would be used was described in 
only one interview. One other interviewee used the term ‘domain analysis’ but it was in the 
context of gaining an understanding of the engineering domain and engineering precedents. 
The teamwork factors, when described by the interviewees, tended to relate to conflicts, 
tensions, team monitoring, information exchange, and shared understanding among team 
members focused on technical aspects of a system. Complexity management typically involved 
technology decomposition and technology requirements management. 
Support at the organizational and program management levels of the systems thinking 
framework would likely be required for the three factors above to be used in support of 
human-focused development activities and human-technology integration. Future research 
could evaluate this hypothesis and future versions of the systems thinking framework may 
further develop the roles and influence of these levels.  More human-related activities may also 
be added to the framework as additional research is conducted and the relationships between 
specific activities and the probability of successful outcome are better understood. Generally 
speaking, the integration of human and technology elements tends to occur well when 
development work includes opportunities for human and technology elements to shape each 
other (e.g., Benbya & McKelvey, 2006; Norman, 2004).  
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Conclusion 
With respect to the success of any systems development project, an engineer reported 
“Quality, schedule, and functionality are success factors. Longevity; is it used in the long term – 
this is another factor of success.”  
This research made possible the development of a framework for analyzing 
straightforward and underlying, or latent, reasons behind the neglect of critical systems 
elements. Use of the framework should help development teams understand factors that can 
lead to a development failure and look out for them in the future. The STF was developed to 
improve systems thinking in systems engineering projects. The framework is expected to help 
developers attend to a broader spectrum of system elements during development and should 
reduce the risk of system development failure.  
Use of the Systems Thinking Framework should help development teams to better 
understand causal factors that can lead to development failures and look out for them in the 
future. Systems engineering processes and projects should therefore become more effective 
and more likely to result in a system in which all elements integrate well. Based on this present 
research, we suggest a certain set of factors that systems development teams should look out 
for; other factors may be added based on future work. Future work should additionally 
investigate risks and strategies associated with the framework factors so that more specific and 
useful guidance can be built into the framework. 
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Appendix A: Description of the various categories in HFACS 
Unsafe Acts 
        The unsafe acts of operators can be classified into two categories: errors and violations, 
as seen in Figure 8. Errors include skill based errors, decision based errors and perceptual errors 
that describe the mental or physical activities of aircrew or the pilots. Violations, on the other 
hand, refer to the willful disregard for the rules and regulations that administrates the safety of 
flight. They include routine and exceptional violations. 
 
 
Figure 13. Categories of unsafe acts of operators. Adapted from “A human error approach to 
aviation accident analysis: The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System” by D. A. 
Wiegmann, and S. A. Shappell, 2003, p. 51. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company. 
 
Errors. Errors can be classified into three types: skill based, decision, and perceptual 
errors. Each of these is summarized below. 
Skill-based errors. Skill-based errors usually occur when a pilot performs an action 
without conscious thought or attention. These are basic actions that he does every day while 
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flying. Errors such as the breakdown in visual scan patterns, task fixation, and the inadvertent 
activation of controls are examples of skill-based errors.  
Decision errors. Decision errors represent errors caused due to poor choices made 
because of lack of knowledge or due to intentional behavior. Decision errors can be grouped 
into three general categories: procedural errors, poor choices, and problem solving errors. 
Procedural decision errors occur in aviation, because it has a number of rigid set of rules and 
procedures to be followed (e. g., Orasanu, 1993). But sometimes in case of emergencies, 
inexperience or time-critical situations, the pilots apply or decide to deviate from a procedure. 
This may sometimes be a poor choice or sometimes even solve the problem. 
  Perceptual errors. Perceptual errors occur when sensory input is degraded; they include 
visual illusions, spatial disorientation or misjudgment of an aircraft’s altitude, attitude, or 
airspeed. Here, the illusion or disorientation is not considered as a perceptual error; but the 
pilot’s erroneous response to the illusion or disorientation.  
 
Violations. Violations are classified into two distinct forms, as summarized below. 
Routine violations. This form of violation tends to be customary by nature and often 
tolerated by governing authority (Reason, 1990). For example, supervisors or the controllers in 
the tower tolerate pilots who fly into marginal weather, thereby creating a possibility of a 
mishap. 
Exceptional violations. Unlike routine violations, exceptional violations appear are 
unpardonable actions, not necessarily indicative of individual’s typical behavior pattern or 
condoned by management (Reason, 1990). For example, pilots engaging in prohibited 
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maneuvers. These errors are considered exceptional because they are neither typical of the 
individual making them difficult to predict. These violations have more probability of resulting 
in a dramatic accident. 
 
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts 
        Two major subdivisions, as seen in Figure 9, of unsafe aircrew conditions were 
developed; substandard conditions of operators and the substandard practices they commit 
 
 
Figure 14. Categories for preconditions for unsafe acts. Adapted from “A human error approach 
to aviation accident analysis: The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System” by D. A. 
Wiegmann, and S. A. Shappell, 2003, p. 56. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company. 
 
Substandard conditions of operators. Substandard conditions of the operators are 
characterized by the categories summarized below. 
Adverse mental states. Adverse mental states relate to those mental conditions that 
affect the performance of the air crew such as the loss of situational awareness, task fixation, 
distraction, and fatigue due to sleep loss or other stressors including increased workload. Also, 
personality traits and attitudes such as overconfidence, complacency, and misplaced 
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motivation are also included in this category. If members of the aircrew, maintenance 
department and the controllers are mentally fatigued, the possibility of an occurrence of an 
error increases. Again, overconfidence, arrogance and impulsivity will influence an operator to 
violate procedures.  
Adverse physiological states. Adverse physiological states refer to those medical or 
physiological conditions that prohibit safe operations such as visual illusions, spatial 
disorientation, physical fatigue etc.  When a pilot is ill, but still goes on to fly the effects of 
visual illusions and spatial disorientation may affect his performance in the cockpit. Thus, it 
becomes necessary for the supervisor to examine the condition of a pilot before he enters the 
cockpit. If a supervisor fails to do this duty, the consequences may be appalling. 
Physical/mental limitations. Physical/mental limitations refer to those instances when 
mission requirements surpass the capabilities of the individual at the controls. For example, 
while flying at night the human vision is severely impaired, yet the pilots sometimes do not take 
enough precautions while doing their maneuvers or doing take off and landing. Unfortunately, 
when precautions are not taken, the result can be catastrophic. Or sometimes, a pilot may not 
be blessed with quick response time due to inexperience or due to genital reasons or his body 
does not suit the requirements of a high- G environment. Now, when they are in an emergency 
situation demanding them to respond quickly, they are helpless. 
 
Substandard practices of operators. Substandard practices of the operators are divided 
into two categories as summarized below.      
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Crew resource mismanagement. Crew resource mismanagement accounts for 
occurrences of poor communication and coordination among supervisors or the air traffic 
controllers and the aircrew or the maintenance personnel. Effective communication and 
coordination should be present among the personnel for flow of important information and for 
producing a quality aircrew. The lessons learnt from the Valujet case study necessitate the 
importance of an efficient aircrew and effective coordination and communication among the 
personnel.  
Personal readiness. Personal readiness failures occur when an operator or controller is 
not physically or mentally prepared for duty. For example, violations of crew rest requirements 
leading to physical fatigue or adverse mental states, and self-medicating will affect pilot or 
aircrew performance. These might have calamitous consequences. Thus pilots and other crew 
members should be physically and mentally fit and ready to do their tasks efficiently. 
 
Unsafe Supervision 
         As explained before, efficient supervision plays a major role in producing high quality 
aircrew. Errors in this level often lead to miserable consequences. Unsafe supervision, as seen 
in Figure 10, can be classified into four categories: inadequate supervision planned 
inappropriate operations, failure to correct a known problem, and supervisory violations. 
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Figure 15. Categories for unsafe supervision. Adapted from “A human error approach to 
aviation accident analysis: The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System” by D. A. 
Wiegmann, and S. A. Shappell, 2003, p. 63. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company. 
 
Inadequate supervision. A supervisor is required to provide guidance, training 
opportunities, leadership, and motivation to produce an efficient air crew. In cases where 
proper training was not given, leading to aircrew coordination skills being compromised and if 
the aircraft hits an emergency situation, the probability of an error being committed and the 
probability an accident would increase drastically. Also, a bad supervision leads to an incident 
of a violation, again increasing the probability of occurrence of an accident/incident. 
Planned inappropriate operations. Planned inappropriate operations relates to errors 
committed when the crew is put into risky situations or when their work schedule becomes 
overwhelming leading to physical and mental fatigue in normal and emergency situations. The 
supervisor should be well organized with his time schedules and should be able to provide high 
quality trainings to the crew to tackle any situation in the best possible manner. Any 
shortcomings in these will have a fatal consequence. 
Failure to correct a known problem. Failure to Correct a Known Problem refers to those 
instances when a problem among individuals, equipment, and training are made known to the 
supervisor, but still remain uncorrected. The failure to correct the deficit on the part of the 
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supervisor will have a dire consequence in the end. For example, when a pilot is ill but still given 
a flight status by the supervisor will lead to adverse mental and physical states while at flight 
ultimately leading to a fatal accident. Thus, it is considered a violation on the part of the 
supervisor, if he fails to correct a behavior or a problem which leads to an unsafe atmosphere. 
Supervisory violations.  Supervisory violations refer to those instances when supervisors 
violate the rules and regulations. For example, letting a person fly without a pilot license is an 
exceptional violation on the part of the supervisor. 
 
Organizational Influences 
        These latent levels of human errors are known to influence the effective working of an 
organization. Reason’s model also allows us to investigate the influences of these levels in the 
causal sequence of the failure. Organizational Influences, as seen in Figure 11, are usually 
related to resource management, organizational climate, and operational processes. 
 
 
Figure 16. Categories for organizational influences. Adapted from “A human error approach to 
aviation accident analysis: The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System” by D. A. 
Wiegmann, and S. A. Shappell, 2003, p. 66. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company. 
 
Resource management. Effective resource management includes the allocation and 
maintenance of organizational assets such as human resources, monetary assets, and 
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equipment and facilities. An efficient resource management usually results in effective time and 
cost benefits. However in times of severe economical downfall, when funds are being cut, the 
supervisors might not be motivated to work efficiently or might be forced to compromise on 
the aircrew training. Also, when adequate facility is not being provided for training and 
maintenance, the skill level and hence the quality of the aircrew, and also the performance of 
the aircraft are put at stake. 
Organizational climate. Organizational Climate refers to the working environment 
within the organization such as the organization’s structure, delegation of authority and 
responsibility, communication channels, that influences the worker performance. An 
organization’s policies and culture echoes its climate. Policies for hiring and firing, promotion, 
raises, sick leave, overtime plays a major role in the performances of its personnel.  
    Cultural elements such as values, attitudes of an organization, also play a major role in 
satisfying the social needs of the personnel. Thus, when these needs are satisfied by the 
organization, its workforce will be motivated to work efficiently bringing about a positive safety 
culture. Deficiencies in a healthy organizational climate increase the probability of an accident. 
Organizational process. Operational Process refers to business decisions and rules that 
administer the day to day activities and processes that take place in an organization. For 
example, establishment and application of operating procedures for maintaining checks and 
balances between the workforce and management. These procedures determine the cadence 
of the operations within the organization by directly influencing work schedules, deadlines etc. 
We have already discussed the consequences of the deficiencies found in the above mentioned 
factors. An organization should also be proactive and have official procedures to tackle 
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contingency situations. This would help the other levels of the organization to continue working 
efficiently even in emergency situations and provide a safe environment for the pilots. 
 
Figure 17. The HFACS framework. Adapted from “A human error approach to aviation accident 
analysis: The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System” by D. A. Wiegmann, and S. A. 
Shappell, 2003, p. 71. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company. 
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Appendix B: Retrospective Interview Questions  
 The following list of open-ended questions was used by Hoffman et al. (2009) in their 
interviews with three of the six systems engineers. 
 What is the most complex system you have been involved in developing? 
 What is the most complex system development team you have been a part of? 
 What specific systems development project has had the most influence on your 
approach and strategies for complex systems development? 
 What overarching systems development models and philosophies were used? 
For the chosen development effort: 
 What systems development model was used? 
 Please describe the organizational structure used to support the effort. 
 How large was the organization/team? 
 Was it a hierarchical or a flat organizational structure 
 How was work divided among groups? 
 How large were groups/teams? 
 How was group/team membership determined? 
 Did members of a given group/team have different or shared task 
responsibilities? 
 What processes and mechanisms were used to communicate and coordinate within and 
across teams, e. g., with regard to: 
 Specific development sub-objectives/milestones? 
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 The overarching design/vision? 
 Progress? 
 Changes in requirements? 
 Design updates? 
 Customer/user feedback? 
 Schedule changes? 
 Design deficiencies? 
 Other… 
 In the selected effort, who or what team was responsible for designing the aspects of 
the system that would affect user performance, i.e., that would be interfacing with 
users? In particular, what types of expertise did team members have? 
 What did this team contribute to the system design? 
 Was this aspect of system development successful? 
 Did the contributions of this team make it into the developed system? 
 Did their contributions add to the success of the effort? In what ways? 
 By what processes did their contributions become incorporated into the larger 
system design? 
 By what processes did their contributions become incorporated into developed 
product? 
 To the extent they were successful, what contributed to their success? 
 What were impediments to their successful contribution? 
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 What did this team do right in terms of coordinating with the team and 
contributing to the design? 
 What could this team have done to better coordinate with the team and 
contribute to the design? 
 What articles were adopted to support the effort (e. g., what different types of plans, 
diagrams, etc? How were requirements documented and communicated)? 
 What procedures were used to minimize communication/coordination breakdowns? , 
and what procedures were used to recover from communication/coordination 
breakdowns? (within and across teams) 
 How to develop effective functional requirements? 
 What methods were used to identify and build requirements? 
 How do you handle changing requirements? 
 How did the business side come upon their expectations/requirements? 
 What processes and mechanisms were used to assess quality? 
 What were the sources of conflict within the development team as a whole during the 
effort? 
 What strategies were used to resolve conflicts or developed to avoid future conflicts? 
 Was this development effort considered successful? Based on what criteria would you 
consider it successful? 
 Was the effort successful from the standpoint of the intended users? Was it delivered to 
the users? Did it help them perform their work, allow them to do their work more 
quickly or efficiently, or allow them to do and/or understand more?  What was the 
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experience of the intended users once the system was delivered (if it was delivered)? 
Did it meet user expectations? How was user satisfaction assessed? 
 Were changes to the system requested following delivery? If so, what types of changes? 
How were they accomplished? 
 What specific systems development experience, class or book has had the most 
influence on your approach and strategies for complex systems development? 
 Based on your general experience, what do you see as the most common problems and 
most serious problems encountered in systems development? 
 What strategies do you think might help prevent or minimize these problems? 
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Appendix C: Coded Interview Transcripts 
Table 10 
Coded Interview Transcripts 
Data-Driven 
(Bottom-up) 
HFACS 
(Top-down) 
Interview Chunks 
DT-OC-IPC RM 
 Two lead engineers, including me, were stolen from another 
team.  
DT-OC-AM 
DT-OS-D 
OC 
So we had 2 leads, 4 regulars, and 4 contractors, all of whom 
had not worked together. There was no established trust 
among these groups, and their management.  
DT-OC-DP 
DT-OS-D 
SDTA-D 
OC 
• We divided the work. 
• I took a part—a big box from the high-level view.  
• It was a type of work where if you did it using classical 1-up 
solutions, it’d have been boring work. I wanted it to be more 
interesting. Sees that now as his motivation. 
• I’d use more elegant ways than classical methods. These 
would be object-oriented techniques using advanced 
methods like design patterns (I had been studying these 
things on my own time). 
• I want the challenge of moving methodology ahead. 
SDTA-D NIL 
 I developed a high-level framework for communicating to 
the 20 protocols/system blocks based on XML. We used an 
XML messaging program manager instead of 20 different 
messaging protocols. 
DT-OS-D NIL 
 
[Prompted to return to timeline of the story] 
• First, we joined the team and divvied up the work 
• I immediately knew what sort of approach I wanted to use. 
• Probably 2nd week, I chose the XML based approach. 
• Then I went off and did the work. 
DT-OC-IPC OC 
• During the first few weeks, I got to know a young engineer. 
I hooked up with him as my protégé. He was assigned to 
another lead. I persisted to get this guy on my team. May 
have traded two contractors for him. 
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DT-TC-IN 
DT-TC-IE 
DT-TC-COOR 
OC 
• That guy was in my face: “What do I do?” and forced me to 
lay down a framework so I could feed and engage him. 
• I had to think of the “little boxes” inside my big boxes so I 
could describe his work logically. There is not a good way to 
communicate in Software-ese: “I need these inputs and these 
outputs, and this is how I need it on the inside.” 
• He’d work for two days and then come back to me. 
DT-OC-IPC 
DT-TC-TM 
OC 
 
 
[I think he was prompted here regarding previous comment 
about scared manager/boss] 
Bits and pieces of what we were doing trickled out as we 
worked so he [the manager] could tell we were doing 
something adventurous.  
DT-OC-AM 
DT-TC-CfM 
OC 
He didn’t demand details. I didn’t provide details or 
communicate. I believe you should do everything you can 
without involving your management. But we had no history 
[of working together]. He chose to trust me rather than 
confront me, but he was very stressed the whole time I found 
out later. 
DT-TC-TM 
DT-TC-COOR 
DT-TC-IE 
NIL 
• In the last two weeks, it seemed to be coming together. We 
trickled out details to my peer lead. He was impressed and 
told his contractors and then they wanted it [the XML 
framework] for something else. The contractors went away 
and tested it and I was surprised when they came back and 
said ‘we like it, and it will save us lots of time.’ 
DT-OC-IPD 
DT-OC-AM 
DT-OS-L 
OC 
 
 
You mentioned other contractors and team members…that 
you traded 2 contactors for someone. Did you interact with 
others? The other lead and I had been introduced to 
everyone. We had a lot of autonomy. The buck stopped with 
us. The managers were clueless. We had decent trust and a 
decent rapport (the 2 leads). He got there a before I did and 
had already grabbed Jared (the young software engineer 
mentioned above). I came in a week later and he had all the 
people. Managers told him to give me people. I joked for a 
week about how all I needed was Jared and he could have the 
rest. Finally I told him I’m serious, You get 4 contractors, I get 
Jared. At that point, I had the guy (Jared), the autonomy, the 
concept. Nothing could stop me. 
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DT-TC-IE 
DT-OC-IPC 
OC 
Did you interact with the other lead? Did he have to know 
what you were doing? • We’d have meetings and see each 
other once in a while. I later realized maybe he could use 
what we were developing. 
• We were on completely parallel paths. I didn’t think our 
work was relevant to his at first; didn’t know what he was 
doing. Didn’t know he could use it…but he later benefited 
from it tremendously. 
 
 
 
 
DT-OC-AM 
DT-OC-DP 
DT-OS-L 
OC 
• The overriding purpose of segregating blocks (of high-level 
diagram) is it allowed us to work in parallel and 
independently until integration.  
• We had weekly formal meetings and took advantage of the 
fact that the managers were clueless. Used them to report 
resource issues—were contractors being used appropriately.  
PM-BS 
DT-TC-IE 
OP Schedule slippages would have been reported. 
DT-OS-D 
PM-QM-RM 
OP 
• With highly divided duties, you don’t have to talk. The 
things we had in common were: 
o Software had to integrate into computers on the 
locomotive 
o Integration of his and my pieces 
• There was a thread between him and me—whether 
software would run on embedded PCs. This was a risk for us 
both. 
DT-OS-L 
PM-QM-RM 
OP 
 
• Risk mitigation is a parallel thread (for leads). As your teams 
are working, Leads work on risk items. 
DT-TC-IE NIL 
What did you do on a daily basis? What did you work on, 
what did Jared work on? How did you work together? 
He didn't have the luxury of being handed a stack of material 
to study and then meeting to go over them. 
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DT-OS - M 
DT-TC-COOR 
NIL 
 The first one is, you know, in terms of difficult 
 or challenging - when you get into structured environment 
 like we were on…tactical trainer. We were tasked to replace 
 the shore based systems that they have both in the Atlantic 
&  
Pacific… * inaudible +…perfect routine… * inaudible +VMH  
* inaudible +……   
  
DT-OS-M 
DT-TC-COOR 
OC 
It was a government led effort so you had 6  
companies with the government technical lead so all the 
 companies were kinda running off doing their own little 
 things and you weren’t getting consistent direction from the 
 government picking 
DT-TC-GS NIL 
the government lead saying, go this way, go  
that way. 
DT-TC-COOR 
DT-OS-LD 
OC 
So you have a lot of different approaches and ideas 
 and nobody centralizing them all in one path folder. So how 
 do you pull something like that together when nobody’s in 
 charge, if you will? 
DT-OS-LD 
DT-TC-GS 
OC 
Your government lead is supposed to be 
 in charge but they are not strong enough as a leader to kinda 
 really grab the team and say, we’re gonna go that way. 
SDTA-REQ OC 
Especially if your customer doesn’t know exactly what  
you’re looking…what they’re looking for and the lots 
 of different alternatives and options that are out there. 
DT-OC-IPC 
DT-OS-M 
RM 
 And  
you get 6 different companies coming in selling them on the  
way they wanna go because it suits them the best. How do 
 you pull that together?  
DT-OS-LD RM 
There’s really no set answer for that 
 you know, how to do that. You hope that your government 
 lead nominates somebody and says * inaudible + they’re in  
charge and move out. We’re gonna listen to them and move 
 forward but it doesn’t always work that way. 
Nil NIL 
 
Most of the other things were just technical  
challenges more than problematic challenges and how  
to actually implement your process through something like 
 this. 
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DT-OS-M 
DT-TC-COOR 
PM-QM-CM 
NIL 
 You may have a system design process  and 
 development process that you  want to put in place but if  
company A over here doesn’t necessarily follow those you’re 
 gonna get different products that are gonna come out from 
that type of thing so, ahmm… that’s probably the best one. 
DT-OS-M 
DT-OC-IPC 
DT-TC-CfM 
OC 
 
I can relate back to the same type of thing where ahmmm 
you’re getting ahhm when you have those distributed teams 
and one person has a solution that you don’t necessarily 
agree with because it promotes their  ahh agenda, or their 
product or you know, those types of things that you feel 
going this direction would be better off.  
EP-P 
DT-OC-DP 
OC 
 
In defense, another example, of [totalship] training, things 
that we’ve done in the past where you have real legacy 
people that are involved with a program they’re very stone 
pipe in the way they think and you’re coming  in with a new 
technology or new way to approach it.  They don’t always see 
that as the right way because it’s gonna replace them as the 
entrenched one with the government customer and ahhh, so 
you constantly fight when you try to introduce new 
technologies and new ways of doing things that they don’t 
always want….(laughs)… welcome those…there’s even your 
government customers for some times ahmm, they don’t 
recognize the power of some of the capabilities.  
DT-OC-DP OC 
And I think we ran into that with Gertz a little bit. Our 
[inaudible ]solution that we had was a complete change from 
what they’re used to and I don’t think the presentation came 
across as well as it should have in  a proposal effort…(laughs). 
Ahmm, you know, so you run against the political factors of 
you know, hey, we like this subcontractor over here and we 
like their reputation so we’re gonna go that way and not 
necessarily go what we’ll call disruptive technologies and 
allow you to introduce new ideas new concepts that goes 
away from what they’re used to. Replace some of those 
legacies , capabilities that are there. 
DT-OS-M 
EP-P 
DT-OC-DP 
DT-TC-COOR 
RM 
I can go back a few years to some stuff that we’d done on, for 
the Army...on like close combat tactical trainer and it’s very 
similar types of problems where you’ve got an integrated 
development team trying to execute and at that time 
Lockheid Martin was the prime trying to get…and they had 
supposed oversight over all the other companies trying to get 
things to execute on schedule and those types of things. 
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DT-OS-M 
DT-TC-COOR 
PM-PR,BS 
OP 
But they weren’t very effective at integration? 
 
Not initially. I mean any large kinda program, I mean, you can 
bid it as a 3-year, 4-year program, it’s gonna take you 6 years 
to get it done. When you’re talking integrating multiple 
companies like that and ahh if all the requirements where 
your customer is not exactly sure what they want and you 
doing a spiral development so you do something they get a 
chance to review it and make comments well, those 
comments that they’re providing based on that review you’re 
already 6 months into the next spiral and they’re making cuts 
so you’re constantly playing catch up. And so you’re spitting 
spiral spiral may be December ’05 but you’re getting 
comments back in June of ’05 and there’s no way you’re 
gonna get it rolled in until  that final delivery so you’re gonna 
be a year or better out from when you’re supposed to be 
finally delivering. 
DT-OS-LD 
PM-PR,BS 
OP 
The government has to recognize those types of things 
when…when they’re providing that feedback in the spiral 
processes, that it’s not gonna end on a set date they have to 
have plans out. A lot of them have gotten a lot better at that, 
at planning things that go past the PCPs or change requests 
or things like that they’re … you know, you’re not done 
December ‘05 you’re gonna make a drop in December ’05 
and there are gonna be changes that need to be…you gotta 
plan and budget those types of things. 
DT-OC-DP RM 
We were an open system so we didn’t build you know like the 
traditional Lockheid Martin proprietary solutions that nobody 
else could play in unless they wanted to give you that 
information which they typically didn’t want to do.  
EP-P 
PM-QM-CM OP 
 
At <my company>, they have extensive processes.  That has 
to do with the CMMI thing.   
DT-OC-DP 
EP-P OP 
 
 
 
And we’re a level 4 wanting to become a level 5 
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EP-P OP 
 
Especially at level 5, that’s the highest.  When you’re at that 
level...there’re benefits to it, but there are some frustrations 
with it, too at times.  
NIL OP 
 
Maybe we’ll start off with you telling us a little bit about your 
background and career.  Do you have a label, like a systems 
engineer? 
 
That’s my current job title.  Backing up, I have an Industrial 
Engineering (IE) undergrad, a Master’s in IE within 
manufacturing engineering.  I was doing a lot with 
automation.  Started with General Electric (GE) in their 
automation program.  They had a big push in “factory of the 
future.”  So they were trying to train some experts and I got 
selected for that.  And I moved around.  Every six months 
they moved you to a different automation area. 
PM-PR OP 
 
But then as I was starting to graduate from the program, GE 
said oh, factory of the future is not as big as we thought it 
would be.  So we’re closing that whole department.  ...so the 
training program got cancelled.   
EP-P RM 
 
So then I left there and ended up going to a small company 
for a year.  And that was when the tech bust happened and 
got laid off from there.   
DT-OC-DP 
SDTA-D OP 
 
Spiral and those... What we’re planning on for this current 
project is doing—they call it modified spiral in the sense of 
it’s more of, we’re kind of taking different builds, and build 
that, and then go back, and do the second build, and the third 
build.  They’re overlapping with each other but they are 
staggered so that you can be adding lessons learned from the 
first one back into the second and third ones.   
SDTA-D NIL 
 
The first one only does simple communication between all of 
the devices.  Might have it do a simple self test or something.  
Second one adds more functionality and the third one ads full 
functionality. 
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SDTA-REQ 
DT-OC-DP 
SDTA-D OP 
 
 
 
 
 
In general, when you’re using this modified spiral, how do 
you develop the requirements? 
 
 
We try to develop requirements for the whole system.  
Because you can’t really get into the spiral unless you really 
know what you’re building for the whole system.  And even 
the preliminary design which is the second step, we pretty 
much do all of that because you want the whole design 
structure that will deal with the whole functionality. As you 
get into detail design is where you start separating it down.  
SDTA-D 
EP-P RM 
For our system, our hardware is going be (more and more 
systems are going this way today) is going to be pretty 
generic hardware there are going to be regular P.C’s that 
we’ll be running on. There will be some dedicated cards that 
we are running on to filter the incoming signals. But it’s going 
to be fairly standard. Years ago there was a very tight 
connection between the hardware and software. 
PM-BS 
PM-QM-RM 
SDTA-D OP 
 So like one of the discussions we are having right now is 
laying out the schedule, and always in the years in the past 
we have had all the key reviews where you review the 
requirements, and you do the preliminary design review and 
the critical design review. So as you go through it’s always 
been hardware and software. In the Hunts program we are 
proposing that we are going to stager those. The hardware is 
running much ahead of the software because it’s like I said, 
pretty standardized. They’re using some off the shelf stuff. 
But they were saying “How can you do that? You need to 
keep them in line” and it’s because of the way we are using 
more of these work station type approaches. The software 
designs are going to run in generic work stations. It’s not as 
critical to have them as closely tied together. 
DT-OC-DP OC 
Ok, one area that was where we kind of went a different way 
than was an approach was when I was working on the F-22 
program down here I was kind of like leading the hardware 
integration and getting the system working than doing the 
low level work and all that.  
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SDTA-T 
DT-OS-M OC 
And there was a different group developing the functional 
software that was going to run in all the hardware. And they 
had planned on doing these fairly detailed testing of 
everything and they had planned to do it as you would 
normally do it.  
SDTA-T 
SDTA-D RM 
With a software debugger where you could insert values, and 
then control the flow of the code and verify, when you put 
these designated inputs in you get this output and you can 
test the functionality of the software. The problem was that 
the debuggers system we had since this was custom 
hardware that was that sophisticated and you also had 
parallel processes and things going on. So we ended up with a 
lot of problems about being able to configure it as well as it 
wasn’t as controllable.  
SDTA-T 
PM-ChM OP 
They wanted to do that testing. And so that’s one of the 
areas where I got quite involved. We ended up having to 
develop these very complicated procedures and stuff to try to 
so something similar to that but never did match the real 
plans we had. So that is where we kind of went a different 
path and had to come up with these work-arounds to do the 
actual testing.  
DT-OS-C 
SDTA-REQ OC 
 
I don’t know as much as you’d say this is a different path, the 
current projects I’m working on, in the past certainly they 
are, and most of the places I’ve worked, the customer 
normally comes in and says “Ok here are the system level 
requirements, this is what we want you to build a system for. 
And we are giving you the requirements.” On this 
modernization project they actually came, they got money 
from congress, and the Navy said “Well we want to 
modernize these. Go figure it out.” So they actually brought 
us in early that’s what we have been doing the last year, 
determining the requirements for the system so we were 
helping them determine how best to modernize it so we are 
coming up with our own requirements.  
SDTA-REQ OP 
So we developed all these requirements given to them, and 
we reviewed them and discussed. And now we are actually 
doing the job and it’s really strange because now all the stuff 
we wrote is coming back as requirements.  
DT-OS-D OC 
 
This project was complex and had a complex team—
collaboration among 15 different universities 
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NIL OP 
 
We were taking daily feeds of news and magazines and 
automatically loaded them into the website; we’d mark them 
up for reading level and categorize. It was redone 
incrementally. We wrote the whole thing. 
PM-CxM 
DT-OC-DP 
SDTA-D 
OP 
For the chosen development effort: 
 
3. What overarching systems development model/s and 
philosophy/ies were used? 
- I tried to keep things modular, tried to adhere to a rough 
framework…system was broken into chunks, any chunks. 
- We used object-oriented programming…a lot of the code 
was old…hundreds of providers were using their own format 
and we had to translate that…”filter” it using our own filter. 
- The object-oriented approach helped with re-use. 
DT-OC-DP 
EP-S 
OP 
We tried to make things backward compatible; we had to 
work with both old and new. 
- Any time we changed something that ran across multiple 
modules, we had to test. 
- It was more of a spiral development effort…make changes 
to pieces then roll them out to production—then make 
changes to other pieces, etc.—tried to produce subsets at a 
time rather than hold everything back. 
- One major change was that we changed to distributed 
multi-host software that required change throughout the 
software—6 months of development; 1 month of test. 
DT-OS-D OC 
4. Please describe the organizational structure used to 
support the effort.  
 
- My team was focused on getting feeds and loading them 
into a database. It had about six people on it. 
- Another team was focusing on how to retrieve the search 
results. I had 2 to 3 people. 
- Another team of 3-4 people was handling web-based 
development. 
- There were a lot of off-shoots to different types of products. 
- Each team had a lead; some people handled daily reports 
generated; another (person) handled feeds from satellites, 
etc., within the team people were specialized but able to take 
over if someone was out. 
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DT-TC-CfM 
DT-TC-COOR 
DT-TC-BCG 
OC 
5. What processes and mechanisms were used to 
communicate and coordinate within and across teams, e.g., 
with regard to:  
 
- Within the team: 
o If we had a problem, we’d go to one another 
o We had monthly meetings within the team 
o Kept track of goals and taught one another new 
technologies for knowledge transfer. 
DT-TC-BCG OC 
- Between teams: 
o Team leads and supervisor had weekly meetings on current 
objectives; this was a formal communication 
o Lots of informal communications 
o At the end of every week, the leads made a report of goals, 
deadlines, and activities from the past week. Gave this to 
supervisors and distributed among team members. We used 
verbal communication to clarify, and this kept us pretty well 
informed. We were responsible for day to day operations and 
the supervisor needed to know. This is how we 
communicated concerns and needs to others and tied 
together teams. 
DT-TC-CfM 
DT-TC-BCG 
NIL 
6. What procedures were used to minimize 
communication/coordination breakdowns?  What procedures 
were used to recover from communication/coordination 
breakdowns? (within and across teams) 
Usually, if there was a problem due to a communication 
breakdown, the person’s understanding of the problem 
would be sent out by email, detailing the problem to 
everyone involved, followed by a meeting. 
DT-TC-BCG 
PM-QM-CM 
OP 
7. What artifacts were adopted to support the effort (e.g., 
what different types of plans, diagrams, etc? How were 
requirements documented and communicated?) 
There were no formal documents…well, actually we did… 
- whenever we had a new content provider. We’d send the 
new content provider a form in which they would specify 
their data format, and then we’d sign off on it. 
- We’d write up documentation for the software. Big sections 
of comment on the use of a module were written at the 
beginning of the code for that module. 
PM-QM-CM 
DT-OS-D 
OP 
 In the case of a big change or a new technology, we’d write 
standalone documentation for it. The Lead ensures this 
happens. 
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DT-TC-BCG 
SDTA-T 
DT-TC-IE 
OP 
A number of different reports were generated weekly: 
o My report: a high level report of activities, problems, goals, 
and deadlines 
o One of my people: What documents came into the system 
and from where, broken down statistically (how many 
documents, what types…) 
o Time to time we were asked to write special 
reports…usually for business reasons, and sometimes for 
technical reasons, e.g., if a server was becoming overloaded 
SDTA-REQ 
DT-OS-C 
OP 
8. What methods were used to identify and build the ‘full’ set 
of requirements? 
We would find out what the requirements were through just 
face to face discussion…”the business people” would tell us 
what they were after. Our users were internal.  
DT-OS-D 
PM-QM 
OP 
We had procedures in place for a new content provider. We’d 
make a pass at the software and then send it to a QA person 
to make sure there were no problems. The business side 
would look at the final product to see if it was what they had 
in mind. 
SDTA-REQ OP 
How did the business side come upon their 
expectations/requirements? 
They identified more formal requirements based on market 
research done on the business side. They’d look at other 
products, talk with users, and do some formal surveys.  
SDTA-D 
PM-QM 
OP 
9. What methods were used to create the system design and 
the design artifacts? 
- We’d do a mockup and the business side would give 
feedback…we’d do a couple of iterations of this (mockup-> 
feedback) depending on the complexity. 
-  
SDTA-D OP 
Technical details that weren’t visible to the outside were our 
prerogative…we just had to ensure we met certain 
constraints: 
o Had to ensure compatibility with other modules 
o Search time couldn’t be more than 5 seconds 
o Disk space, server resource issues (resources brought in to 
handle expansion) 
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SDTA-T 
PM-QM 
OP 
10. What processes and mechanisms were used to assess 
progress/status? 
and 
11. What processes and mechanisms were used to assess 
quality? 
- We did assessment via an automated system we built to 
monitor the availability of the system/website and to make 
sure that what gets turned up in the searches makes sense. 
 
NIL NIL 
1. What is the most complex system you’ve been involved in 
developing? 
- What about this system made it complex? 
C3Core, because it’s been developing for close to 10 years 
and due to ever-changing user requirements, functionality 
sets, and architecture, and making sure it’s set up for future 
changes.  
DT-OC-DP 
SDTA-REQ 
PM-ChM 
NIL 
For almost all systems, the #1 risk is change. No software 
systems start with a set of requirements and that’s what’s 
done. True requirements are said to be impossible to attain in 
software engineering (versus manufacturing engineering) 
Software architectures can’t be seen the way house 
architectures can be. 
NIL OC 
2. What is the most complex system development team 
you’ve been a part of? 
- What about this team made it complex? 
C3Core, because over the course of 10 years, people come 
and go bringing different skills and tool sets. It’s a very 
dynamic team. 
PM-CxM 
DT-OS-D 
RM 
3. What specific systems development project has had the 
most influence on your approach and strategies for complex 
systems development? 
- At a high level, describe how the experience has influenced 
you. 
The biggest thing is getting everyone synchronized; forming 
group consensus is very very difficult.  Programs don’t scale 
linearly; as the number of people grows, the amount of 
information increases exponentially. Teams with more than 
about 10 people don’t work because you can’t get consensus. 
Divide the team into subdomains or projects and coordinate 
between groups. If you don’t subdivide the team correctly, it 
won’t work (allocate work to appropriate people…) 
97 
SDTA-D OP 
For the chosen development effort: 
 
4. What systems development model was used? 
Evolutionary and Spiral type of design. Each program (add-on 
to C3Core) brings its own constraitns.  
PM-BS 
DT-OC-DP 
DT-OS-D 
NIL 
5. Please describe the organizational structure used to 
support the effort. 
Small teams of 1-4 people working on a task using very short 
1-2 week spirals of development. Short spirals help keep 
people from diverging in their thinking; provide frequent 
checkpoints. 
Everyone has an expert domain area (e.g., GIS system, 
database), and everyone is cross-pollinated into other areas, 
e.g., when a subsystem spills into the GIS system the two 
associated teams cross-pollinate (=how?). 
DT-OS-D RM 
Team is not big enough to have dedicated designers, testers, 
coders; Generally, the team is involved through the 
requirements phase, design phase, etc. with the best team 
member for each phase designated as the point person.  
The team is augmented with external supervision in the guise 
of QA. This role reviews requirements, design, and 
implementation. 
EP-S 
PM-QM-CM 
DT-OC-DP 
OP 
6. What artifacts were adopted to support the effort? 
Informal processes are becoming more formalized. We have 
a project plan, test plans, schedules, etc. that are required by 
CMMI. Before, we used white-board sketches, oral schedules, 
weekly progress meetings (which still happen). 
CMMI helps or hurts? 
In a fire drill, the formalities are difficult; we have adapted 
lightweight versions of the processes. Done incorrectly, 
CMMI can kill your program; it’s easy to generate docs; hard 
to generate good docs. A bad doc can really throw a team off.  
NIL OP 
CMMI helps or hurts? 
In a fire drill, the formalities are difficult; we have adapted 
lightweight versions of the processes. Done incorrectly, 
CMMI can kill your program; it’s easy to generate docs; hard 
to generate good docs. A bad doc can really throw a team off. 
PM-QM-CM OP 
Classic lesson learned: when I was a project manager at 
DuPont, the heating system steam pipe came to the heating 
system with a gap of 6 inches. I couldn’t sign off on the 
system, but the engineer said, “Well, look at the document,” 
and sure enough… 
Once an artifact is created it has to be maintained. 
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Paperwork should lead you forward, not be a diary. 
PM-QM-CM OP 
CMMI should involve creating an artifact trail so you can 
backfeed a design implementation all the way back to the 
money. Level 3 (level used by interviewee) involves gathering 
artifacts. 
SDTA-REQ NIL 
7. What methods were used to identify requirements? 
Requirements come at different levels. We get high-level 
requirements…well what does this really mean?  
Requirements include: 
- Program/Project Requirements 
- Software Requirements 
- Test Requirements 
Depends on your business model, too. We’re using other 
people’s money to develop software we can sell. 
 
 
 
 
SDTA-REQ OP 
How do you identify requirements? 
If the customer gives you good requirements, then you 
analyze them for gaps and conflicts: Are they good? Missing 
things?...and as you do that, what implied requirements need 
to be there to build this monster? 
SDTA-REQ OP 
How do you identify gaps and conflicts? 
We take a schoolbook approach to decomposing the 
requirements given us by the customer (“Fish out of 
water…”—??) 
High level functional descriptions is where we start, via 
storyboarding or CRC cards (mini use-case; we write a 
function on each card and group the cards [card sorting]). We 
also use brainstorming and what-ifs. 
Use cases are problematic because they are ambiguous with 
respect to language. 
PM-ChM 
SDTA-REQ 
OP 
How do you handle new and changing requirements? 
Build an open and flexible architecture. It’s always like a 
crapshoot, you have to do it at least 3 times to get it right.  
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SDTA-REQ 
PM-ChM 
OP 
What’s “doing it right?” 
Doing it right means it survives the test of time and survives 
re-use. By about the 3rd time they’ve got it right, and on 
every iteration it goes faster. 
DT-OC-DP 
PM-ChM 
PM-BS 
RM 
A spiral, evolutionary prototype design approach was used 
for FCS. 
There’s new software, new hardware, new languages…every 
few months. Any program has to be adaptable. You have to 
understand requirements will change and have to insulate 
yourself from that. Programs, including C3Core, take smaller 
chunks, e.g., four 1-mth blocks of development, demo once a 
month, wait for change requests, and then assess new 
requirements and inform customer regarding costs, 
tradeoffs, etc. 
DT-OS-D NIL 
 
1. What is the most complex system you’ve been involved in 
developing? 
IE NATOPS. 
What about this system made it complex? 
 team was a relatively large group and was a changing group.  
DT-TC-COOR NIL I came in late 
DT-TC-COOR OP 
It was a tablet-based application. Tablets were a new 
technology for me. I wasn’t sure what we were trying to do or 
what could be done 
DT-OS-M NIL 
 
2. What is your most complex system development team 
involvement? 
- What about this team made it complex? 
- 2 ½ software engineers; the ‘1/2’ was coordinating with 
Penn State 
- project manager 
- subject matter expert 
PM-BS 
DT-OS-DP 
OP 
 
For the chosen development effort: 
 
3. What overarching systems development model/s and 
philosophy/ies were used? 
- I’m usually working on two to three projects at a time. This 
affects the sequence and how and why I do things. 
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DT-OS-DP OP 
In retrospect, I’m a proponent of agile development. Don’t 
over-design upfront. Do just enough design to get 
implementation going and to meet short term objectives. Get 
functional specs going, get some software going, and then 
reconcile the two. The size of the system makes this more do-
able. Since we were doing research…what’s possible? This 
model supports exploration of technology and what it allows 
you to do. 
DT-OS-DP OC 
 
 e.g., Word and browser and cell phone: combine them, 
validate, then design more based on the results. You don’t 
know upfront if it will work. 
DT-TC-COOR OC 
Has to be communication at some point between software 
and cognitive systems engineers so that neither diverges too 
far from the other or that the application is headed toward 
the unusable (due to a divergence from what’s possible). 
- Hand-in-hand development 
- XP (extreme programming); agile development 
DT-OS-D NIL 
 
4. Please describe the organizational structure used to 
support the effort. For example: 
- how large was the organization/team? 
- was it a hierarchical or a flat organizational structure? 
- how was work divided among groups? 
- how large were groups/teams? 
- how was group/team membership determined? 
- did members of a given group/team have different or shared 
task responsibilities? 
- The organizational structure was somewhat hierarchical. 
There was a functional group and a financial group. 
Functional was divided into two groups--one focused on what 
we were going to do (the functional people) and the other 
group focused on how we were going to do it (the 
implementation people). 
DT-OS-TMC NIL 
Team membership was defined based on availability, 
philosophy, and had to have someone who could analyze 
technology. 
The ‘How we’re going to do it’ team had to include people 
who could: ID hardware; make the interface build itself 
dynamically; figure out how to switch from day to night 
lighting; and architect the overall application. 
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DT-OC-DP 
DT-OS-D 
DT-TC-IE 
NIL 
 
5. What processes and mechanisms were used to 
communicate and coordinate within and across teams, e.g., 
with regard to:  
- specific development sub-objectives/milestones? 
- the overarching design/vision? 
- progress? 
- changes in requirements? 
- design updates? 
- customer/user feedback? 
- schedule changes? 
- design deficiencies? 
- other… 
 
Specific development sub-objectives/milestones? The 
overarching design/vision? Progress? 
- We used paired programming: code is developed quickly 
(although a little less quickly than with one programmer) and 
it’s better code. The two programmers switch-off between 
typing and reviewing where code is going from a higher level. 
The two personalities have to have a common programming 
style (often a problem). The two people use design patterns 
to communication and share concepts of development. 
- Paired programming + Brainstorming + Design + Knowledge 
Exchange 
- Design patterns= similar techniques are always used to do 
certain things. Patterns characterized in terms of: when to 
use, when not to use, trade-offs, which patterns work well 
with others…not canned code…e.g., proxy, façade… 
DT-TC-IE OC  Team needs to work closely and with similar styles 
DT-TC-IE NIL 
Communication at the software level occurred during 
implementation (via paired programming approach) 
- Other communication took place at a white board. This was 
used for working out and communicating higher level 
constructs 
PM-BS OP 
Development milestones, etc. were established with 
“functional people”, based on what the functional people 
wanted and the “implementation people” could deliver. 
- Milestones get ordered based on which products the 
functional team has ready and a broader vision of the 
functional specifications 
102 
DT-OC-DP OP 
Changes in requirements?design updates? 
- Agile development says you don’t write to accommodate 
future desires because it may be wasted effort (this person 
doesn’t try to accommodate specific future desires, but does 
try to build flexibility into the software and tries to build in 
functions that would support a wide range of users and 
circumstances). 
- You write good code quickly and if the functional 
specifications change, you re-write the code quickly. 
DT-TC-BCG OP 
How do you get the big picture early (big picture of the 
development goals, etc…)? 
- I don’t think there’s a good solution. It doesn’t go very well. 
- Lots of meetings 
- Some documentation. Documentation is difficult—it takes a 
lot of effort but may not be what you want. 
 
SDTA-REQ 
SDTA-D 
DT-TC-MA 
OP 
Interface: When will it work? When won’t it work? Software 
people need to the software to be able to handle 100% of the 
cases…functional requirements give a solution that addresses 
70% of the cases (or less)…and the users get boxed in.  To 
handle this, go back and forth between the software 
implementers and those developing functional requirements 
to address the other 30%. 
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Appendix D: Calculation of Percent of Correspondence between Coders 
 The table presents five examples of high level codes assigned to data elements by 
Coders A and B. The third and the fourth columns show the process adopted to determine the 
correspondence. 
Table 11 
Process Used for the Calculation of Percent of Correspondence between Coders 
Coder A codes Coder B  codes Match 
Percent of 
Correspondence 
assigned 
System 
Development Team 
–Organizational 
Structure –
Customers, Users, 
and Developers  
 
System 
Development 
Team-
Organizational 
Culture-Internal 
Politics, 
Competition, and 
Conflicts 
 
System 
Development 
Team-
Organizational 
Structure-
Development team  
 
System 
Development 
Team-
Organizational 
Culture-Internal 
Politics, 
Competition, and 
Conflicts 
1/1 (one match between 
the high level code used; 
DT) 
1 
System 
Development 
Team-
Organizational 
Culture-Internal 
Politics, 
Competition, and 
Conflicts 
System 
Development  
 
Project 
System 
Development 
Team-
Organizational 
Structure-
Development team  
 
 
System 
Development 
Team-
Organizational 
2/3 (two matches between 
three high level codes; DT, 
PM, and SDTA) 
0.66 
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Management- 
Customer and User 
Expectations 
Management  
 
System 
Development 
Technical Activities-
Requirements 
Development, 
Allocation, and 
Management  
Culture-Internal 
Politics, 
Competition, and 
Conflicts 
 
Project 
Management- 
Customer and User 
Expectations 
Management 
System 
Development 
Team-
Organizational 
Culture-Internal 
Politics, 
Competition, and 
Conflicts 
 
Project 
Management- 
Customer and User 
Expectations 
Management 
Project 
Management- 
Customer and User 
Expectations 
Management 
1/2 (only one match 
between two high level 
codes used; DT, PM) 
0.5 
System 
Development 
Team-
Organizational 
Culture-Internal 
Politics, 
Competition, and 
Conflicts 
 
Project 
Management- 
Customer and User 
Expectations 
Management  
 
System 
Development 
System 
Development 
Team-
Organizational 
Structure-
Development team  
 
System 
Development 
Team-
Organizational 
Culture-Internal 
Politics, 
Competition, and 
Conflicts 
1/3 (one match between 
three high level codes; DT, 
PM, and SDTA) 
0.33 
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Technical Activities-
Requirements 
Development, 
Allocation, and 
Management 
System 
Development 
Team-
Organizational 
Culture-Internal 
Politics, 
Competition, and 
Conflicts 
External Pressures-
Politics, 
Competition, and 
Conflicts external 
to System 
Development team  
0/2 (No match between 
high level codes; DT, EP) 
0 
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Appendix E: Taxonomy of Team Processes  
Table 12 
Taxonomy of Team Processes  
Process Dimensions Definition 
Transition Processes   
Mission Analysis 
formulation and planning 
Interpretation and evaluation of the team's mission, including 
identification of its main tasks as well as the operative 
environmental conditions and team resources available for 
mission execution 
Goal Specification Identification and prioritization of goals and sub goals for 
mission accomplishment 
Strategy Formulation Development of alternative courses of action for mission 
accomplishment 
Action Processes   
Monitoring progress 
toward goals 
Tracking task and progress toward mission accomplishment, 
interpreting system information in terms of what needs to be 
accomplished for goal attainment, and transmitting progress to 
team members 
Systems Monitoring Tracking team resources and environmental conditions as they 
relate to mission accomplishment, which involves (1) internal 
systems monitoring (tracking team resources such as 
personnel, equipment, and other information that is generated 
or contained within the team), and (2) environmental 
monitoring (tracking the environmental conditions relevant to 
the team) 
Team monitoring and 
backup behavior 
Assisting team members to perform their tasks. Assistance may 
occur by (1) providing a team verbal feedback or coaching, (2) 
helping a teammate behaviorally in carrying out actions, or (3) 
assuming and completing a task for a teammate 
Coordination Orchestrating the sequence and timing of interdependent 
actions 
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Interpersonal Processes   
Conflict Management Preemptive conflict management involves establishing 
conditioned to prevent, control, or guide team conflict before 
it occurs. Reactive conflict management involves working 
through task and interpersonal disagreements among team 
members 
Motivation and confidence 
building 
Generating and preserving a sense of collective confidence, 
motivation, and task-based cohesion with regard to mission 
accomplishment 
Affect Management  Regulating member emotions during mission accomplishment, 
including (but not limited to) social cohesion, frustration, and 
excitement 
Note. Adapted from “A temporally based framework and taxonomy of team processes” by M. A. Marks, J.E. 
Mathieu, and S. J. Zaccaro, 2001. Academy of Management Review, 26(3), 356-376, p. 363. 
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Appendix D: Team Dimensional Training Prebrief  
Table 13 
Team Dimensional Training Prebrief  
INFORMATION EXCHANGE COMMUNICATION 
The first dimension is information exchange. 
Effective information exchange allows the 
team to develop and maintain shared 
situation awareness. 
 
The components of information exchange 
are: 
* Utilizing all available sources of 
information 
* Passing information to the appropriate 
persons   without having to be asked 
* Providing periodic situation updates which 
summarize the big picture 
The second dimension is communication. 
While information exchange deals with what 
is passed to whom, this dimension involves 
how that information is delivered. 
 
The components of communication delivery 
are: 
* Proper phraseology 
* Completeness of standard reports 
* Brevity/Avoiding excess chatter 
* Clarity/Avoiding inaudible communications 
    
SUPPORTING BEHAVIOR INITIATIVE/LEADERSHIP 
The third dimension is supporting behavior. 
This involves compensating for one another 
in order to achieve team objectives. 
 
The components of supporting behavior are: 
* Monitoring and correcting team errors 
* Providing and requesting backup or 
assistance to balance workload 
The fourth dimension is 
initiative/leadership. Anyone on the team 
can demonstrate initiative/leadership. 
 
The components of initiative/leadership are: 
* Providing guidance or suggestions to team 
members 
* Stating clear and appropriate priorities 
Note. Adapted from “Team dimensional training:  A strategy for guided team self-correction. In J.A. Cannon-
Bowers and E. Salas (Eds.), Making Decisions under Stress:  Implications for Individual and Team Training” by K.A. 
Smith-Jentsch, R.L. Zeisig, B. Acton, and J.A. McPherson, 1998, 271-297, p. 276. Washington, DC:  APA Press. 
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Appendix G: Description of the final set of data-driven codes 
Table 14 
Final Set of Data-Driven Codes with Description 
Final Codes Description 
1)     System Development Team 
  
  a) Organizational Culture 
Deals with work place environment, 
employee interactions, and the effects of 
their actions on the environment. 
     a. Internal Politics, Competition, and Conflicts 
Deals with politics, conflicts, competition 
(for resources and credibility) 
 within the organization, and issues 
arising as a consequence. 
     b. Attitudes about Management  
Attitudes developed about the higher 
management 
     c. Development philosophy/Acquisition strategy  
Philosophies and strategies advocated 
and used for development and  
acquisition processes. 
  b) Organizational Structure (including changes) 
Deals with line of authority; their roles, 
responsibilities, and relationships; and 
Information flow between them.  
     a. Multi-Company Development Team: Roles,    
Responsibilities, and Relationships 
Roles, Responsibilities, and Relationships 
     b. Development Team: Roles, Responsibilities, 
and Relationships 
Roles, Responsibilities, and Relationships 
     c. Customers, Users and Developers: Roles, 
Responsibilities, and Relationships 
Roles, Responsibilities, and Relationships 
     d. Leadership: Roles, Responsibilities, and 
Relationships 
Roles, Responsibilities, and Assignment  
    e.  Team Member Characteristics 
Capabilities of members and how they are 
grouped into a team 
  c) Team Coordination and Communication 
Deals with team processes and how team 
members communicate and resolve 
various issues 
    a.  Mission Analysis, Formulation, and Planning 
 Interpret and evaluate team’s purpose; 
identify main tasks, detect and  
respond to changes in operative 
environment; assess available resources. 
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    b.  Goal Specification 
Identify and prioritize goals for mission 
accomplishment 
    c.   Team Monitoring and Back-Up Behavior 
 Cross-check or monitor teammates for 
the purpose of assisting 
 proactively; provide/request assistance. 
    d.   Coordination 
Coordinate task sequence and timing. 
    e.   Conflict Management 
Preemptive- Prevent, control, or guide 
situation to preempt possible  
conflict; Reactive- Work through task-
related and interpersonal  
agreements among team members. 
     f.   Initiative 
Advocate a specific source of action, team 
priorities, and task  
assignments. 
    g.   Information Exchange 
Provide information for coordination 
purposes. 
    h.   Build Common Ground and Awareness 
Updating and Educating the team 
members about every process to increase 
awareness 
    
2)      System Development Project Management  
(including management philosophy, attitudes, 
and practices)  
  
  a) Planning / Re-planning  
Planning the course of the project, 
projected outcomes, materials and  
resources needed, planning and being 
prepared for changes. 
  b) Contracting 
Deals with policies and decisions 
regarding contract agreements. 
  c) Budget and Schedule 
Estimation of the budget and schedule, 
related errors and issues faced due to an 
overshoot of budget and schedule. 
  d) Complexity Management 
 Issues faced coping with the complexity 
of the system and its infrastructure, 
strategies adopted for optimization. 
  e) Quality Management  
Deals with quality planning, control, 
assurance and improvement methods 
adopted and issues faced. 
    a. Configuration Management  
Documenting requirements and changes, 
design and operational information 
throughout a system lifecycle, to check 
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for consistencies with its function, 
attributes.  
    b. Risk Management 
Identification, assessment, prioritization, 
and strategies adopted to manage risks, 
and employ resources effectively during 
unexpected events. 
 f) Customer and User Expectations Management 
Managing user expectation and issues 
faced due to changing customer 
expectations and demands. 
 g) Development Team Selection 
Deals with the selection criteria and 
issues considered while selecting the 
development team 
 h) Change Management 
Managing changes at any part of the 
system lifecycle and issues faced due to 
changes 
    
3)      System Development Technical Activities 
  
  a) Requirements Development, Allocation, and 
Management 
Method adopted to deal with 
requirements, communication and 
allocation of requirements, and managing 
changing requirements. Also problems 
faced in these processes. 
  b) Design and Development (of architecture, 
software, etc.) 
Deals with the development process 
used, design criteria, strategy and 
methods adopted, and issues dealt with 
during the process 
  c) Testing/Evaluation  
Method of testing employed, issues 
related with testing/evaluation. 
  d) Integration/Interfacing (of system components) 
Issues related with integration of system 
components like hardware, software and 
related processes. 
  e) Deployment (i.e., Integration with operational 
environment  
and users; includes maintenance)  
Issues which arise when the product is 
being delivered and deployed at the 
operational environment. Includes issues 
of maintenance, integration with the 
operational environment, and ease of 
usability by users. 
  f)  Acquire Domain Knowledge 
Acquiring adequate knowledge about the 
project and the product and a thorough 
understanding of the processes. 
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4)      External Pressures 
  
  a) Politics, Competition, and Conflicts external  
to System Development Team  
Pressures and issues faced due to 
government Politics, dominance of a 
superior company, competition from 
smaller companies. 
  b) Systems Engineering Industry Trends and  
Practices (e.g., CMMI and Re-use) 
Pressures and issues arising due to 
meeting with CMMI standards, present 
market demands, new trends and 
practices in systems engineering industry. 
 
